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Jane C. Murphy" 
Legal storytelling is an engine built to hurl rocks over walls of 
social complacency that obscure the view out from the citadel. . . . 
The messages say, let us knock down the walls, and use the blocks 
to pave a road we can all walk together.) 
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The VISIon of law as an agent of social change is well estab-
lished.2 The expectation that courts and legislatures will have a cre-
ative role in improving the law is one that has, however, lost much 
of its power and vitality. Both the general public3 and lawyers them-
selves4 increasingly view the practice of law as an essentially com-
mercial rather than political enterprise.s The reasons for this are 
many, but are rooted primarily in the current economic6 and political 
c1imate7• Lack of enthusiasm for engaging in law reform efforts also 
stems from a growing perception that legislative or litigation victories 
have limited value in effecting long term, widespread social change.8 
2. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE: REFoRMING PRIVATE LAW 11 
(1969); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO. THE GROWTH OF THE LAw (1924); ROSCOE POUND. 
INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923). 
3. See Linda L. Castle, Mikva: Don't Worry About Our Reputation. A.B.A. J., Feb. 
1985, at 135; Alessandra Stanley, Selling Voters on Bush, Nemesis of Lawyers. N.Y. TiMES. 
Aug. 31, 1992, at AI. 
4. See James E. Brill, The Secret of Success, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1992, at 100 (stating that 
only 63% of recent law school graduates would again choose to be lawyers); Stephanie B. 
Goldberg, Then and Now: 75 Years of Change, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 56, (finding that 
lawyers are increasingly approaching their work as a business rather than a profession); Jon 
Jefferson, But What Role for the Soul?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 60; Irving R. Kaufman. 
Idealism vs. Reality, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 22, 1990, at 13; Edward W. Lempinen, Of Billables 
and Breakdowns. STUDENT LAW., Dec. 1990, at 4; Saundra Torry, Surveys Find the Law 
Offers Lawyers Little Time for a Life, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1991, at F5. 
5. A study of employment trends by the National Association for Law Placement indi-
cates that. from 1974 to 1991, public interest and government employment have steadily 
declined, while employment with law firms has increased. NATIONAL AssOCIATION FOR LAW 
PLACEMENT, SELECTED CLASS OF 1991 ERSS FINDINGS 3 (1992). Of course, these findings 
may be somewhat misleading; they may reflect more the realities of the job market than the 
career choices made by recent law graduates. See Irving R. Kaufman, Squandering Future 
Talent, NAT'L LJ., May 27, 1991, at 15; Robert B. McKay, The Road Not Traveled: 
Charting the Future for Law, Law Schools and Lawyers, A.B.A. J. Nov. 1990, at 76; The 
Abandonment of Public-Interest Law, LEGAL nMES, Oct. 30, 1989, at 21. But see Mara 
Block & Hazel S. Kandall, As Young Attorneys Reassess Careers, Interests Now Mean as 
Much as Income, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 18, 1991, at 48. 
6. See Peter F. Lake, The Business of Law: Changes in the Legal-Talent Market, 
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 49. 
7. See, e.g., Francis T. Coleman, New Rules for Civil Rights, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 
78. 
8. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HoPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOur So-
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One response in the face of the growing conservatism and cyni-
cism about the law's power to effect social change is to turn to other 
disciplines. Stories about lawyers making mid-life career changes and 
"dropping out" from the practice of law are heard on an increasing 
basis.9 Another, perhaps ultimately more promising, response to 
changing political and economic realities is to develop new strategies 
for social change within the context of the legal system. This Article 
explores the potential of one method of effecting social change in the 
context of the legal system-integrating powerful human stories in 
law reform efforts. 
The role of the narrative or story in legal discourse has been ex-
plored and developed in legal scholarship over the last several 
years. JO The goals of the various calls for more storytelling in the 
legal context vary.lI They generally relate, however, to a desire to 
move away from exclusive reliance on abstract legal argumentation to 
persuade. The goals of "storytellers" are also linked to furthering an 
understanding of the dynamics of oppression based on race or gender, 
or both.12 
CIAL CHANGE? (1991) (examining empirical data on the results of judicial decisions in the 
areas of civil rights, abortion, womens' rights, environmental protection, and criminal proce-
dure. concluding that courts are rarely effective producers of change); Deborah L. Rhode, The 
"No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE LJ. 1731 
(1991) (finding that despite substantial formal change in the legal status of women, significant 
gender inequalities stilI exist in all aspects of women's lives). But see Linda S. Greene, Fem-
inism. Law. and Social Change: Some Reflections on Unrealized Possibilities, 87 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 1260 (1993) (articulating optimism about the use of the law to achieve concrete gains 
in social and political empowerment of women). 
9. A survey of recent law school graduates found that 47% of women were consider-
ing leaving the profession. Brill, supra note 4. at 100. Another survey of 207 graduates from 
20 law schools from the class of 1983 found that 42% of the respondents considered leaving 
the practice of law. Marilyn Tucker et aI., Whatever Happened to the Class of 1983? 78 
Goo. LJ. 153. 155-56. 185 (1989); see also DEBORAH L. ARRON. RUNNING FROM TIlE LAW: 
WHY GooD LAWYERS ARE GETI1NG OUT OF TIlE LEGAL PROFESSION (1989); Carolyn 
Hughes. To Be or Not to Be: Some Lawyers Would Rather Not, WASH. LAw .• Nov.lDec. 
1990, at 44. • 
10. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Coun, 1982 Tenn-Fonvard: Nomos and 
Narralh'e, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983); Delgado, supra note 1; Robin West, Jurisprudence as 
Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modem Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985). 
11. Martha Minow. Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language. and 
Family Violence. 43 VAND. L. REv. 1665. 1688 (1990) (describing the various goals of story-
telling as giving "voice to suppressed perspectives[.1" helping to "build a reservoir of alter-
native understandings through which existing practices can be criticized[,1" and "enhanc[ing] 
the chances of persuading people to act who currently are in a position to effect change"); 
see also Pedagogy of Narrative: A Symposium. 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990) (describing the 
various ways storytelling has been used in the classroom to improve legal education). 
12. Critical race and feminist narrative scholarship have taken a variety of forms. Some 
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The judicial and legislative processes have always included a 
narrative component. 13 Clinical legal scholarship has also explored 
the critical role of narrative in client representation, particularly in 
interviewing and counselling.14 Recently, however, scholars seeking 
methods to make the law more responsive to those historically unrep-
resented in lawmaking have argued for a more explicit use of the 
narrative to highlight the human concerns in a given legal issue. 
Others have built upon the work of these scholars to explore the 
specific ways in which legal storytelling can accomplish law reform 
goals. IS Most recently, a related body of scholarship has begun to 
develop which seeks to critique the value of narratives in both clari-
fying legal issues and persuading legal decision-makers to reform the 
law.16 Can stories persuade legal decision-makers to act in a particu-
lar way by "creat[ing] a bridge across gaps in experience and thereby 
elicit empathic understanding[?],,17 
This Article seeks to respond to that question. It begins with a 
brief examination of the impact of law reform campaigns of the last 
twenty-five years aimed at eliminating race and gender discrimination. 
scholars have used autobiographical accounts. See, e.g., Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the 
Seamless Web: Thoughts on "R~production" and the lAw, 13 NOVA L. REv. 355 (1989); 
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ. 1087 (1986). Olher scholars have mixed their own ac-
counts wiJh Jhe stories of others. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered 
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991). Fiction has also 
been used to illustrate Jhe dynamics of oppression eiJher Jhrough the original fictional ac-
counts of scholars, or Jhrough Jhe literary texts of others. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT 
THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES 
AT THE BOTTOM] (original fictional account); James A. Epstein, Rhetoric of Silence: Some 
Reflections on lAw, Literature, and Social Violence, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1701 (1990) (literary 
texts of oJhers). 
13. See, e.g., Carol Angel, Teaching Storytelling Skills for Court, L.A. DAILY J .. Mar. 
8, 1991, at 7; Sharon Creeden, How to Use the Art of Storytelling in Litigation: Telling Your 
Client's Story to the Jury, TENN. BJ., May/June 1991, at 10; Steven Lubet, The Trial as a 
Persuasive Story, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 77 (1990); Kathryn H. Snedaker, Storytelling in 
Opening Statements: Framing the Argumentation of the Trial, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 15 
(1986). 
14. AnJhony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty lAw Practice: Learning Lessons of Client 
Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107 (1991); Christopher P. Gilkerson, POl'erty lAw Narratives: The 
Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 
861 (1992). 
15. See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 
(1987); Minow, supra note 11. 
16. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991); Toni 
M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of lAw: New Words, Old Wounds?, 
87 MICH. L. REv. 2099 (1989). 
17. Minow, supra note II, at 1688. 
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There is general consensus that many of the law reform efforts on 
behalf of women and people of color have failed to produce the full 
measure of positive change expected from the new laws. This Article 
suggests that the gap between goals and results may be explained in 
part by the deficiencies in the legal discourse surrounding the process 
of achieving legal change. 
This Article then examines the legal story's potential as a key 
element in social change strategy by exploring the specific role it has 
played in domestic violence law reform. Domestic violence is a par-
ticularly useful lens through which we may examine much broader 
questions about whether and how the law can affect social change. 
Issues surrounding domestic violence are critically linked to the op-
pression of women. Freedom and equality for women can never be 
achieved without freedom from violence. Domestic violence is also an 
issue where the legal system's failure to respond effectively seems 
directly linked to the inability of the predominately male decision-
makers to understand the victim's need for protection. It is, therefore, 
an issue where legal storytelling can help create the kind of empathic 
understanding needed to produce meaningful reform. 
A case study analyzes a series of successful domestic violence 
law reform campaigns in one jurisdiction over the last decade. This 
"history of storytelling" gives an empirical backdrop to the theories 
advanced in recent scholarship about the power of the narrative in 
eliciting empathic understanding on the part of legal decision-makers. 
It provides a vivid example of a successful practical application of 
the theoretical work of feminist and critical race scholars. Advocates' 
decision to place greater and greater reliance on narratives from vic-
tims to persuade decision-makers played a significant role in 
achieving much-needed law reform. The lessons of this law reform 
campaign have value and application as strategies which can work in 
other law reform efforts. This analysis of these law reform campaigns 
also clarifies the ways in which narratives persuade and function in 
arguments for feminist or other legal change. 
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
The question whether law, as it is enacted by legislatures and 
interpreted by courts, can effect fundamental changes in society is a 
complex one. An appropriate starting point in exploring the connec-
tions between law and social change is to define terms. "Social 
change" can be described as the phenomena of transforming current 
power structures that perpetuate inequalities based on class, gender, 
1248 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1243 
race, ethnicity, age, or sexual orientation. "Social change lawyering" 
or "law reform work" refers to the efforts to change the laws which 
establish or perpetuate these inequalities.18 Major focuses for these 
efforts include the workplace, 19 schools,20 the housing market,21 
and the health care system.22 It is accurate to say that legal norms 
effect and reinforce hierarchies,23 but to what extent can changes in 
legal norms dismantle hierarchies? 
Major social issues inevitably become reduced to legal questions 
in some form.24 It is not difficult to identify significant legal victo-
ries over the last few decades that have been designed to effect major 
social change. Landmark legislation and litigation have resulted in 
statutes and decisions which have as their explicit goals eliminating 
inequality for women,2S people of color,26 gays,27 and other 
18. Justice William F. Ryan. a member of the Federal Court of Appeals of Canada, de-
scribed the broader purpose of law reform as "the examination of the law in the light of 
policy. of social objectives. of philosophy." William F. Ryan. The Law Reform Commission 
of Canada: Some Impressions of a Former Member. 25 U.N.B. LJ. 3. 4 (1976). 
19. See, e.g .• Vicki Schultz. Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpre-
tations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest 
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1749 (1990). 
20. See, e.g .• Hon. Gerald W. Heaney. Busing. Timetables, Goals, and Ratios: Touch-
stones of Equal Opponunity. 69 MINN. L. REv. 735 (1985); Joseph E. Krakora. Note, The 
Application of Title IX to School Athletic Programs, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 222 (1983); 
Kimberly A. Mango, Comment, Students Versus Professors: Combatting Sexual Harassment 
Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 23 CONN. L. REv. 355 (1991). 
21. See, e.g., Florence W. Roisman, Establishing a Right to Housing: A General Guide, 
24 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 203 (1991) (developing a law reform strategy for securing a right 
to housing). 
22. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Health Care and Social Change, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 
419 (1985). 
23. See generally Mary Joe Frug, Commentary: A Postmodem Feminist Legal Manifesto 
(An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1992) (describing the ways in which legal 
rules construct differences and hierarchies between the sexes). 
24. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "Scarcely any political question arises in the 
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." 1 ALExIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945). 
25. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988); Civil Rights Act of 
1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988); In-
ternational Union v. Johnson Controls. Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (female employees cannot 
be excluded from jobs because of gender-based fetal protection policy); County of Washing-
ton v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (state cannot pay female jail guards less than men 
holding similar jobs); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (state law giving husbands 
unilateral control over marital property is unconstitutional); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677 (1973) (unconstitutional for U.S. Armed Forces to require husbands, but not wives. to 
prove actual dependency to qualify for spousal benefits). 
26. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d. 2000e-2 (1988); Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3606 (1988); see also Griggs v. Duke Power 
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underrepresented and oppressed people. 
In recent years, the law reform victories in federal courts have 
diminished,28 but state court litigation and federal legislative lobbying 
for social change continue with what appears to be notable success?9 
Still, a cynicism about whether this kind of lawyering effects lasting 
and real change is growing.30 A brief look at the results of decades' 
of law reform work in two areas of social change lawyering-im-
proving the status of women and people of color-demonstrates that 
such cynicism is well-founded. 
In the area of race discrimination, evidence of formal change 
exists. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education,3l the fIrst Civil Rights Act in seventy-fIve years was 
passed.32 Subsequently, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made race dis-
crimination in employment and education illegal.33 Within eight years 
of its passage, over ninety percent of southern school districts were 
desegregated.34 The Voting Rights Act of 1965,35 along with its 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that Title VII prohibits employment practices unrelated to 
job performance that operate to exclude blacks); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (outlawing segregation in the public schools); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) 
(holding that restrictive housing covenants are unenforceable). 
27. See CAL. ClV. CODE § 51.7 (West Supp. 1993); CAL. HEALm & SAFETY CODE 
§ 33051 (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501, 1-2515, 1-2520 (1992); HAw. REv. 
STAT. § 368-1 (Supp. 1992); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-013 (Michie Supp. 1992); 
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 3, ch. 272, § 98 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. ExEc. LAW 
§ 296 (Conso!. 1983 & Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT. §§ 101.22, 111.31 (1988 & Supp. 1993). 
28. See, e.g., AMy SWAUGER & LAUREN FISHBEIN, AM. AsSOC. OF UNlV. WOMEN, 
BALANCING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1988) (examining the impact of the Reagan 
administration's judicial appointments); Tony Mauro, High Stakes. Low Courts, WASH. 
MONTIlLY, July/Aug. 1992, at 16 (examining the federal judiciary's shift to the right as a 
result of twelve years of ReaganlBush appointees); see also Rachel N. Pine & Sylvia A. 
Law, Envisioning a Future for Reproductil'e Liberty: Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 
27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407, 408-13, 439-41 (1992). 
29. Su Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. III 1992); Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988); see also Pine & Law, supra note 28, at 434-
35. 
30. ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 169 (arguing that real social change occurs only when 
forces independent of the courts (e.g., the media and economic and demographic changes), 
create pressure for reform). 
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
32. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
33. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
n 2000c to 2000c-9, 2000e-2 (1988». 
34. ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 52. 
35. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
n 1971, 1973 to 1973ff-6 (1988». 
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1970 amendments,36 provided direct federal action to enable blacks 
to vote and suspended the use of literacy tests that had been a source 
of racial discrimination for nearly a century. 
The evidence of continuing institutional racial bias, however, is 
overwhelming. Since 1959, there has been virtually no change in the 
percentage of African-Americans living in poverty relative to the 
percentage of white Americans living in poverty,37 and while some 
middle-class African-Americans prospered in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
black-white income gap has widened over the last fifteen years.38 
The rate of impoverishment for households headed by African-Ameri-
can women is even greater.39 Further, the life expectancy of African-
Americans is four years shorter than that of white Americans,40 and 
the African-American infant mortality rate, which is substantially 
higher than the rate at which white infants die, continues to rise at an 
alarming rate.41 A recent study on the status of African-American 
men in urban areas provides a bleak and shocking picture.42 For ex-
ample, the study revealed that in the Baltimore area fifty-six percent 
of African-American males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-
five were in prison, on parole or probation, being sought on arrest 
warrants, or awaiting trial.43 
To some, these statistics demonstrate the inability of law to 
effect social change because of the limited impact of judicial ac-
tion.44 These grim numbers lead others to conclude that the problem 
36. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973ff-6 (1988». 
37. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, NO. 766, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 
1986 457 (106th ed. 1985) [hereinafter CENSUS] (in 1959 18.1% of white and 55.1% of 
black families lived below poverty level; this ratio was essentially unchanged in 1984). 
38. Richard Bernstein, Twenty Years After the Kerner Report: Three Societies, All Sepa-
rate, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 29, 1988, at B8. 
39. Margaret C. Simms. Black Women Who Head Families: An Economic Struggle, in 
SUPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS: THE STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN 141 (Margaret C. Simms 
& Julianne Malveaux eds., 1986) (African-American families headed by women have much 
lower incomes than other two-parent African-American families). 
40. CENSUS, sllpra note 37, at 68, No. 106. 
41. See id. at 72, No. 112 (mortality rate of black infants was 63.8% higher than that 
of white infants in 1950; by 1982, it was 94.1% higher); see also Black Infant Mortality 
Risks Studied, 132 SCI. NEWS 218 (1987) (black infants twice as likely as white infants to 
die during their first year). 
42. See NATIONAL CENTER ON INSTITUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES, HOBBLING A GEN-
ERATION: YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF 
AMERICA'S CITIES: BALTIMORE, MARYLAND (1992). 
43. Id. at 1-2. 
44. ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 10-21. 
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is not in the complexity of the institutions but in the lack of commit-
ment to change.4s The real motivation behind contemporary civil 
rights policies is not racial equality. Rather, "landmark" legislative 
and judicial actions are meant to provide symbolic victories which 
placate people while offering no real improvement in the condition of 
African-Americans.46 
An examination of the much-heralded law reform victories in the 
area of women's rights reveals a similar picture of the dichotomy 
between formal rights and real change. Laws intended to remove sex-
based disparities have fallen short of changing many aspects of 
women's lives and of eliminating biases that perpetuate inequality. 
Despite activity in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of 
government in the 1960s and 1970s aimed at remedying women's 
inequality, the evidence of continuing sex discrimination is over-
whelming. Women working full-time still earn sixty-four cents for 
every dollar earned by men,47 despite major federal laws enacted in 
196348 and 196449 that prohibit sex-based wage discrimination. 
Women still comprise only 7.4% of the federal judiciary, 7.2% of the 
state judiciary,SO 6.9% of engineers,sl 19.5% of physicians,52 and 
45. See BELL, FACES AT TIlE BOITOM, supra note 12 (describing the failures of the 
civil rights movement in allegorical stories and Socratic dialogues between the author and a 
fictional character named Geneva Crenshaw); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE 
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter BELL, WE ARE NOT SAVED) (same); 
see also Alan D. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLrncs OF 
LAw 96 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination 
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L, 
REv. 1049 (1978). 
46. As Bell has written: 
Even the poorest whites, those who must live their lives only a few levels above, 
gain their self-esteem by gazing down on us •.•• Over time, many reach out, 
but most simply watch, mesmerized into maintaining their unspoken commitment to 
keeping us where we are, at whatever cost to them or to us. 
BELL, FACES AT TIlE BOITOM, supra note 12, at epigraph. 
47. U.S. BUREAU OF TIlE CENSUS, No. 157, CURRENT POPULATION REPoRTS, CONSUMER 
INCOME (1987). But see FRANCINE BLAW & MARIANNE FERBER, THE EcONOMICS OF WOM-
EN: MEN AND WORK (1992); CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING TIlE GENDER GAP: AN 
EcONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN (1992); Sylvia Nasar, Women's Progress Stalled? 
Just Not So, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at Cl (all concluding that women made significant 
strides toward pay equality in all strata of the workforce during the 1 980s). 
48. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). 
49. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
SO. Report of the Commission on Women in the Profession: Part T, 9 A.B.A. SEC. Bus. 
LAw. UPDATE 6, 7 (1988). For a breakdown of federal judicial appointments, see HUMAN 
RESOURCES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S., U.S. COURT DIRECTORY, (Spring 1993). 
51. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS 
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22.2% of lawyers in the United States.53 Analyzing the gap between 
formal equality and inequality in women's lives, Deborah Rhode has 
concluded that "formal rights mask[] inequality in daily experi-
ence.,,54 
Scholars and practitioners have advanced a variety of theories to 
explain the gap between the goals of women's rights legislation and 
case law, and the aftermath. Failure to include those who will be 
responsible for implementation of a court order or legislative mandate 
in the law reform process has been identified as one problem.55 The 
refusal of the courts and the legislature to take the initiative on such 
critical issues as caretaking leaves, flexible schedules, and affordable 
childcare is another explanation for the failure of law to affect social 
change in this area.56 "Cultural barriers," "economic constraints," and 
underlying gender bias are also offered as reasons for the limited so-
cial change.57 
Clearly, new strategies for using the law as a tool to end oppres-
sion of women and people of color are needed. Fundamental changes 
in the way we approach social change lawyering may also be needed. 
The focus may ultimately have to shift, from seeking formal changes 
in the law that eradicate gender or racial discrimination to transform-
ing the current power structure. Within the context of this call for 
broad change, many scholars and practitioners are urging those in the 
"outgroup" to tell their stories.58 In this way, legal decision-makers 
may act out of deeper understanding and compassion. This empathy 
should help them to shape more creative legal solutions and to ensure 
vigorous implementation of these reforms. 
DERIVED FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: 1948-1987 689 (1988). 
52. Id. 
53. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE U.S. 395 (lIIth ed. 1991). 
54. Rhode, supra note 8, at 1768 (examining the limited impact of legislative and court 
battles to eliminate occupational inequality). 
55. See. e.g., Susan A. MacManus & Nikki R. Van Hightower, Limits of State Constitu-
tional Guarantees: Lessons from Effons to Implement Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PUB. 
ADMIN. REv. 269, 270 (1989) (stating that resistance to policy change in domestic violence is 
related to political or bureaucratic competition between executive and legislative branches). 
56. See Rhode, supra note 8, at 1767-68. 
57. ROSENBERG. supra note 8, at 214-26. 
58. Richard Delgado defines the outgroups as "groups whose marginality defines the 
boundaries of the mainstream, whose voice and perspective-whose consciousness-has been 
suppressed, devalued, and abnormalized." Delgado. supra note I, at 2412. 
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n. TELLING STORIES: IMPROVING BOTH PROCESS AND REsULTS IN 
LAW REFORM CAMPAIGNS 
A prOIDlsmg new strategy for effecting lasting social change 
through law reform work is to make storytelling a central component 
of law reform efforts. By this I mean refocusing the attention of legal 
decision-makers-state and federal agency executives, legislators and 
judges-to the human dimension of the problem before them. This 
strategy may take many forms, but my focus is on the impact of 
direct storytelling on legislatures, individual policy-makers and the 
courts. By not allowing the story to be told by others, this strategy 
forces legal decision-makers' to acknowledge the pain that results from 
the legal system's inadequate response to human problems. It is a 
way to "connect" a legal decision-maker to experiences outside his 
own. As Toni Massaro describes it: 
This storytelling theme ties in to the empathy theme in several 
ways. Stories tend to work directly from "experiential understand-
ing," which the empathy writers encourage us to use. Consequently, 
narrative may be a particularly powerful means of facilitating em-
pathic understanding: a concrete story comes closest to actual expe-
rience and so may evoke our empathic distress response more readi-
ly than abstract theory. Telling stories can move us to care, and 
hence pave the way to action.59 
There is nothing new in this. The notion that the people most 
directly affected by court decisions or legislation should be heard in 
the process seems self-evident. And yet, legal decisions and lawmak-
ing consistently occur in an atmosphere where discussion of the law's 
impact on people's day-to-day lives is almost non-existent. This "un-
hinging of the law from human experience"60 is justified on the the-
ory that law is rational and objective.61 Classical legal thought views 
the law as a science in which legal judgments are made by applying 
objective rules to facts and reaching consistent and predictable re-
sults.62 We are a "government of laws, not men" and adhere to a 
59. Massaro. supra note 16, at 2105. 
60. Henderson, supra note 15, at 1574 (citing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERsONS AND 
MASKS OF THE LAW (1976». 
61. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1986) (defining legalism as "the ethical attitude 
that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist 
of duties and rights determined by rules"). For a discussion of the introduction of classical 
orthodoxy into American legal education, see Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. 
Pm. L. REv. 1 (1983). 
62. See Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: 
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system of "neutral" laws which are supposed to ensure fairness and 
impartiality in the application of the law.63 Historically, therefore, 
legal theorists have viewed any discussion of the reality of pain and 
suffering that results from oppressive laws-or the absence of 
laws-as a corruption of the lawmaking process. Injection of such 
emotion, they claim, would produce chaos and irrationality in the rule 
of law.64 
What is really happening here? Is it that the human experience is 
being ignored in lawmaking? Or is it that the experiences of the 
decisionmaker are the only experiences reflected in the "neutral" 
process of lawmaking? As feminist theory and feminist litigation have 
sought to clarify, "one's personal experience is inextricably linked 
with one's legal analysis.,,65 To the extent that the legal decision-
makers primarily reflect one dominant perspective-that of the white 
heterosexual male-the perspectives of the "others," the diverse 
groups making up the majority, are often undermined or undervalued. 
This point is well developed in recent feminist66 and critical race 
scholarship,67 and is demonstrated in the inadequacy of the law's 
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. IN L. & Soc. 3, 8-9 
(1980). 
63. See id. at 3-9. 
64. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER. THE CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 2, 9 
(1986). Of course, the existence of rules does not preclude a humanistic response to a prob-
lem. Some rules are developed as a result of empathic understanding. One example of such a 
rule is the child support formula which was designed, at least in part, as a response to the 
overwhelming evidence of human suffering, primarily on the part of women and children, that 
results from discretionary child support standards. See Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of 
Discretionary Justice in Family lAw: The Child Suppon Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 209, 
226-30 (1991). 
65. Lesbians, Gays and Feminists at the Bar: Translating Personal Experience into 
Effective Legal Argument-A Symposium, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 107, 107 (1988). 
66. See. e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829 
(1990) (analyzing ways in which women have been ignored in developing legal rules); Diane 
Polan, Toward a Theory of lAw and Patriarchy, in THE POLmCS OF LAW 299 (David 
Kairys ed., 1982) (arguing that law is essentially a male instrument and that male-normed 
experience dominates decisionmaking); Martha Minow, The Supreme Coun. 1986 
Tenn-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987) (concluding that laws 
are inadequate to respond to problems of women and other groups because their perspectives 
were not considered in the lawmaking process). 
67. See. e.g., Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in 
Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK LJ. I, 3 (1989) (referring to the "standard mode" of 
legal reasoning's "presumption of perspectivelessness" where "what is understood as objective 
or neutral is often the embodiment of a white middle-class world view"); Mari J. Matsuda, 
Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1763, 1763 
n.3 (1990) (defining critical race theory as "the work of progressive legal scholars of color 
who are attempting to develop a jurisprudence that accounts for the role of racism in Ameri-
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response to race and gender discrimination.68 
What role can the narrative play in the creation and implementa-
tion of statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions that increases the 
potential for lasting change? Does further reliance on the narrative 
offer any promise of narrowing the gap between formal rights and 
real equality? 
In discussing law reform efforts to achieve racial equality, some 
argue that the successes achieved so far exist only because of a con-
scious insistence that legal decision-makers focus on the human costs 
of racism. The arguments of Thurgood Marshall in Brown v. Board 
Education69 and its companion cases have been heralded as examples 
of the way in which narrative can be used to highlight the human di-
mension of the struggle to persuade for change.7o Rather than relying 
on conventional abstract legal argumentation, Marshall forced the 
Supreme Court to consider the experience of segregation and the 
human pain it caused.71 And even while despairing about the com-
can law and that works toward the elimination of racism as part of a larger goal of eliminat-
ing all forms of oppression"). 
68. Another striking example of the persistent denial or devaluation of diverse human 
experience in legal decisionmaking is the courts' and legislatures' responses to differences in 
sexual orientation. Lynne Henderson describes the "phenomena of prejudice, stereotypy, blind 
categorization, and denial of the humanity of a group of people" that was presented by the 
Supreme Court's majority opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Henderson, 
supra note IS, at 1638-41. The case involved a challenge to the Georgia sodomy statute after 
Michael Hardwick was arrested for committing a felony when an officer observed him engag-
ing in oral sex with another man in his own bedroom. Henderson notes the complete absence 
of any discussion of Hardwick as a person in the various court decisions, arguments, and 
briefs, including the arguments and briefs of Hardwick's own attorney. As a result, he "be-
came another disembodied person onto whom fears, prejudices, and false beliefs could be 
projected." Id. at 1639. The failure in Bowers to eliminate the oppressiveness of the Georgia 
statute for homosexuals might have been avoided, Henderson concludes, had the Court been 
offered a narrative that emphasized the human dimension of a law that permits the state to 
invade a person's home and monitor his or her sexual practices for potential criminal prose-
cution. 
69. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
70. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976); Henderson, supra note 
15, at 1593-1609; Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for 
Social Change, 52 U. PITT. L. REv. 723, 728 (1991). 
71. Marshall's ability to persuade others through the use of narratives apparently contin-
ued unabated during his years on the Court. See Sandra D. O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: 
The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1217 (1992) (analyzing the impact Marshall 
had on her during their shared tenure on the bench). Noting the value of an account Mar-
shall gave of racial prejudice in a death penalty case, O'Connor wrote that "his story made 
clear what legal briefs often obscure: the impact of legal rules on human lives." Id. at 1218; 
see also Anthony M. Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1221 
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mitment to racial equality in this country, the works of Derrick Bell 
and other critical race scholars demonstrate the potential of narratives 
to expose the failure of current civil rights policy.n Bell's chroni-
cles, retelling past and present civil rights struggles, force the reader 
to rethink events and, through that rethinking, to recognize the deep 
gap that exists between the expressed goals of failed policies and the 
lives of outsiders like Bell's fictional alter ego, Geneva Crenshaw.73 
Richard Delgado argues persuasively that stories of outgroups can 
attack complacency and, as part of a civil rights strategy, provide the 
"promise [of] at least the possibility of success.,,74 
In the area of women's rights, the development of the law sur-
rounding the regulation of maternal conduct during pregnancy pro-
vides a striking example of both the problem of defining legal issues 
without regard for women's experiences and the potential of the nar-
rative to inform the lawmaking process. The failure to give predomi-
nate consideration to women's experience in pregnancy forms a con-
sistent pattern in legislation and cases dealing with the legal regula-
tion of reproduction. The decisions in major Supreme Court cases on 
abortion over the last decade focus over and over again on the fetus 
or the physician rather than the experience of the woman before the 
Court or the women who will be affected by such decisions.7s 
The absence of language reflecting women's actual experiences 
in pregnancy, birth, and abortion is also notable in decisions involv-
ing new reproductive technologies. The framing of the legal issues 
surrounding the regulation of surrogacy contracts, for example, has 
been marked by language which denies the biological realities of 
(1992). 
72. See supra notes 4S-46 and accompanying text 
73. In the chronicles, Geneva Crenshaw moves from pessimism and cynicism, to a be-
lief that at least some cracks in the foundation of racism in this country may be evident. See 
BELL, FACES AT TIIE BOTTOM, supra note 12; BELL, WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 4S. 
74. Delgado, supra note 1, at 2437-38. 
7S. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). While acknowledging that Roe's establishment of a right 
to abortion represented a victorY for American women, Lynne Henderson argues that its con-
sistent and continuing erosion since 1973 occurred, in part, because the "narrative of 
'unwanted' pregnancy and its effect on women was underdeveloped when Roe was decided." 
Henderson, supra note IS, at 1620. Henderson also attributes much of the "rather peculiar 
flight from the reality of women in the abortion cases" to the fact that women in these deci-
sions "were faceless, and indeed nameless-disembodied accumulations of medical and social 
data." Id. at 1620, 1629; see also Lucinda Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The 
Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886, 900-01 
(1989). 
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pregnancy. As many commentators have noted, the term "surrogate" 
ignores the connections between the biological mother and her child 
and limits her to the role of a substitute who enters into an agree-
ment to bear a child for another.76 This polarization of the mother's 
and fetus's rights is reflected in decisions and statutes regulating sur-
rogacy.77 
Court decisions ordering women to undergo forced caesarean 
sections also provide examples of how the law is distorted as a result 
of the denial of women's reproductive experiences. Describing a case 
in which a hospital was permitted to perform a caesarean section on a 
terminally ill mother without her consent, Marie Ashe stated: 
Certainly, the medicalization of our "reproductive" processes has 
significantly distanced most of us-including legislators and judg-
es-from the immediacy of the female bodily experiences of preg-
nancy, birth, and abortion. That distancing has obscured the horror 
and fear that-ethnologists theorize-arises universally in the face of 
female violence and that seeks to control and regulate women's 
"mortal decisions" for the reason that such decisions remind us of 
our frailties: our dependence upon the flesh and minds of our moth-
ers; the finitude of our bodily lives; the constant imminence of a 
death that may swallow us up. Is it possible to speak of experiences 
of abortion and other "mortal decisions" in a different discourse, 
outside the language of law and medicine?78 
76. See, e.g., MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 4-5 (1988); BARBARA K. 
ROTIlMAN, REcREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TEcHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHIAL 
SOCIETY 22-25 (1989). 
77. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rei. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 
(Ky. 1986). But see ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (West 1991) (prohibition on entering 
into, inducing, arranging, procuring, or otherwise assisting in the formation of a surrogate 
parenting contract; surrogate is designated the legal mother, and the surrogate's husband is 
designated as the legal father); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(i) (West 1990) (contracts for the 
purchase, sale, or transfer of custody of parental rights in exchange for any valuable consider-
ation are void and unenforceable); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1989) (surrogate parenthood 
contracts are void and unenforceable; biological father has both rights and obligations if such 
a child is born); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (Michie 1990) (surrogacy contracts (defined 
as contract for profit) are prohibited and unenforceable; all persons, agents, and institutions 
are prohibited from facilitating such contracts; the biological mother is granted all rights and 
obligations for the child). 
78. Ashe, supra note 12, at 374. In the case discussed, In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 
1987), reh'g granted and judgment vacated, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988), and on reh'g, 573 
A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990), A.C. was diagnosed as having cancer at age 13 and had undergone 
aggressive treatments, including surgery, throughout her life. At age 27, after her cancer had 
been in remission for three years, A.C. married and became pregnant During her 25th week 
of pregnancy, A.C.'s physicians discovered a carcinoma in her lung, and she was admitted to 
the George Washington University Hospital. Her prognosis was terminal, and her condition 
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In contrasting her own experiences with birth, miscarriage and abor-
tion with those of other women, Ashe makes a powerful argument for 
reproductive freedom. Her moving descriptions of her experiences 
demonstrate the inadequacies of laws developed from a discussion of 
. maternal versus fetal rights and framed in medical and legal terms. 
Medical and legal experts should not dominate the discourse on this 
subject. Concrete human stories add so much more to our under-
standing of the issues than abstract legal principles. The complex, 
varied stories of women provide no easy answers. In the area of 
reproductive choices, however, these stories illustrate with more clari-
ty than all the Supreme Court decisions on the subject, that no regu-
lation is probably the best solution in most instances when women 
are facing "mortal decisions" involving their reproductive processes. 
As Marie Ashe concludes: 
The self-accounts of mothers and of all women-pregnant, birthing, 
aborting, suffering violations or growing in power-constitute utter-
ances closer to the reality of women's experiences than does any 
formulation of law or of medicine. While our generalizations and 
extrapolations from those experiences may be in conflict, when we 
attend to one another we discover truths that, rising out of our natu-
ral and acculturated bodies, do not conflict. How to work those 
yarns into the fabric of a law that calls itself "humanist"? . . . I 
want a law that will let us be-women. That, recognizing the vio-
lence inherent in every regulation of female "reproduction," defines 
an area of non-regulation, within which we will make, each of us, 
our own "mortal decisions.'>79 
rapidly deteriorated. She was under heavy sedation when the hospital sought a declaratory 
order as to whether it should perfonn a caesarean section in an attempt to save the life of 
the fetus. The trial court entered an order pennitting the hospital to perfonn the operation 
without obtaining A.C.'s consent, and a motion to stay that order was denied in an emergen-
cy appeal. The caesarean was perfonned immediately thereafter. The child died a little more 
than two hours after the operation, and A.C. died two days later. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 
at 1238-41. 
79. Ashe, supra note 12, at 382-83; see also Finley, supra note 75, at 900 (arguing that 
the conflicting rights in the law's approach to issues of women's reproductive freedom "utter-
ly fails to capture the meaning of the experience of pregnancy to women"). 
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ill. THE ROLE OF THE NARRATIVE IN 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW REFORM 
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Feminist narrative scholarship has focused on a variety of issues 
in which traditional legal discourse-with its dominant male perspec-
tive-has proven inadequate. In the areas of workplace equityso and 
reproductive freedom,81 narrative scholarship has been particularly 
effective in making abstract claims of the oppressiveness of women's 
lives more tangible. Because it has historically been linked to silence 
and inaction from the legal system, domestic violence is another area 
in which narrative can play a powerful role in destroying stereotypes 
and prompting legal change. 
A. The Problem and the Resistance to Change 
The staggering dimensions of the problem of domestic violence 
have been well-documented.82 Women and children are overwhelm-
ingly the victims.s3 They come from all racial, ethnic, religious, and 
socio-economic groups, from all age levels and educational back-
grounds.84 Battering by a spouse or intimate partner is the single 
largest cause of injury to women in the United States.8S Each year 
over one million women seek medical treatment for injuries inflicted 
by their husbands, ex-husbands, or boyfriends.86 
80. See Rhode, supra note 8, at 1768-70 (discussing EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. m. 1986»; Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal 
Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128 (1989). 
81. See, e.g., Ashe, supra note 12. 
82. This Article begins by describing the problem in statistical terms. The limitations of 
using numbers to illuminate or describe this problem have been noted by Martha Minow, 
supra note 11, at 1684-87 (analyzing the ''troubled relation" between the general-statistical 
evidence of domestic violence-and the particular-individual victims' stories-in the language 
of domestic violence policy analysis). These numbers provide a starting point, however, from 
which the uninitiated can gain an understanding of the breadth of the problem. This Article 
argues that such information has to be combined with narrative accounts, explaining the reali-
ties of the problem in a variety of contexts recognizable to a wide audience, including legal 
decision-makers. 
83. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPoRT TO THE NA-
TION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 21 (1983) (stating that 95% of domestic violence 
victims are women). 
84. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 18-19 (1979). 
85. WOMEN'S ACTION COMMiTTEE, WAC STATS: THE FACTS ABOUT WOMEN 55 (1993). 
86. Between 1978 and 1982 an annual average of 2.1 million women were victims of 
domestic violence; this may be an underestimate of the problem since only 52% of incidents 
of abuse are actually reported to the police. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & CHRISTOPHER A. 
INNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPoRT: PREVENTING 
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Battering within a family very often extends to the children. In 
homes where domestic violence occurs, children are abused at a rate 
1500% higher than the national average.87 
Behind these grim statistics and expert accounts are stories of 
women and children who have felt the pain, degradation, terror, and 
despair of domestic violence. A few well-publicized accounts of do-
mestic violence do reach the public, and seem to increase public 
awareness of the problem. These accounts come to us through best-
selling autobiographies, like the story of a white, middle-class former 
teacher and wife of a prominent lawyer in the Reagan Administration, 
who experienced a marriage of seventeen years which included regu-
lar beatings with injuries ranging from a broken ear drum to severe 
permanent neck and back injuries.s8 
They reach us through television and magazine accounts, like the 
story of a twenty-three-year-old mother of two from Connecticut 
whose husband beat her repeatedly, culminating in a vicious attack 
that left her permanently paralyzed on one side.89 Some accounts 
dominate newspapers and tabloids for extended periods of times, like 
the shocking story of isolation, substance abuse, beating, and neglect 
that killed a six-year-old child and left her battered adoptive mother 
in a horrifying limbo between victimization and criminal responsibili-
ty.90 Some accounts reach the highest tribunals of justice, like the 
story of a little boy who suffered severe physical abuse at the hands 
DoMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1. 3 (1986). 
87. One Colorado study reported that 53% of husbands who baltered their wives also 
abused their children. WALKER. supra note 84; see also Liane V. Davis and Bonnie E. 
Carlson. Observations of Spouse Abuse: What Happens to the Children. 2 J. INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 278 (1987). A study of children in shelters for baltered women found higher rates 
of child abuse in families where there is wife abuse than in other families. SELECT COMM. 
ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, & FAMILIES, 100m CONG., 1ST SESS., WOMEN, VIOLENCE, & TIlE 
LAw: A FACI' SHEET (1987) [hereinafter WOMEN, VIOLENCE, & TIlE LAW: A FACI' SHEET]. 
88. CHARLOlTE FEDDERS & LAURA ELLIOIT, SHAlTERED DREAMS (1987). 
89. See Patricia Brennan, "A Cry For Help": The Victim's Own Story, WASH. PoST, 
Oct. I, 1989, at Y8; Millions Awarded Beaten Wife Who Sued Connecticut Police, WASH. 
POST, June 26, 1985, at A7; Jeannie Park et al., Thousands of Women Fearing for Their 
Lives, Hear a Scary Echo in Tracy Thunnan's Cry for Help, PEoPLE WKLY., Oct. 9, 1989, 
at 112. 
90. See Fred Bruning, An Unnerving Tale of Domestic Abuse, MACLEAN'S. Feb. 27, 
1989, at 9; Ken Gross, Denying His Guilt, Joel Steinberg Tells How He Cared for the Child 
He Killed and the Lover He Beat, PEoPLE WKLY., Mar. 13, 1989, at 71; Richard Lacoyo, A 
Question of Responsibility: Joel Steinberg is Guilty, but are Others Also at Fault?, 'nME, 
Feb. 13, 1989 at 68; Michele Launders, A Child's Death, A Mother's Tonnent, PEoPLE 
WKLY., Aug. 27, 1990, at 66; Outrage: The Death of an Innocent Exposes a Grim Reality: 
Child Abuse, LIFE, Jan. 1988, at 121. 
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of his mother, herself a victim of abuse-when she failed to produce 
him for the authorities, the legality of her indefinite incarceration for 
contempt and the details of his abuse were considered by the United 
States Supreme Court.91 
While these stories do focus public attention on the problem,92 
they do little to communicate the continuum of violence in the home 
to which large numbers of ordinary women are exposed every day, 
with no dramatically publicized ending for either victim or batterer.93 
Those of us who provide legal services to victims of domestic vio-
lence94 have some perspective on the actual nature and incidence of 
domestic violence. We know that these isolated stories do not begin 
to describe the pervasiveness and scope of this national problem. 
The following account, while perhaps less dramatic than the 
preceding stories, better represents the actual experience of many 
victims. The story unfolds as a mother of five seeks advice. She and 
her five children left their home the night before to escape a beating 
that began with a shove and ended with rape. She will be allowed a 
limited amount of time in a shelter. As she and her children seek 
legal protection, they are faced with problems ranging from the im-
mediate challenge of finding alternative housing and money for basic 
necessities, to the long-term problem of sorting through the myriad of 
civil and criminal legal proceedings that will ensure their safety and 
settle custody and visitation arrangements that will not subject them 
to further abuse. The effects of violence in this family spill out to in-
volve other family members, the classrooms to which the children 
will go after a night of chaos and fighting or hiding in a shelter,9S 
91. Baltimore Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990). 
92. Interestingly, most of the stories that receive intense media attention seem to involve 
white victims while the public continues to perceive domestic violence as a problem of poor 
minorities. See, e.g., Alison Bass, Doctors Falter on Spotting Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, June 
22, 1992, at 15. 
93. The fact that most well-publicized stories involve cases of extreme physical cruelty 
may limit the possibilities for empathic understanding of the problem. Such cases-with their 
horrifying examples of violent behavior that has accelerated to the point of being life threat-
ening-allow viewers and listeners to distance themselves from both the batterer and the 
victim. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 15-17; see also LINDA GoRDON, HERoES OF THEIR 
OWN LIVES: THE POLmCS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 1-6 (1988). 
94. The author is the Director of the Family Law Clinic at the University of Baltimore 
School of Law, in which approximately 28 students each year represent from 60 to 80 clients 
in domestic cases. At least half of these cases involve patterns of family violence. 
95. Teachers whose students live in homes where violence and chaos are the norm must 
deal with the effects on children of long-term exposure to violence (developmental delays, 
depressions, disruptive and violent behavior at school), as well as the legal issues and safety 
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the places of employment to which both the victim and the batterer 
will return-unless an injury or court appearance causes an ab-
sence,96 and the hospitals that provide treatment.97 
Can the law provide any help?98 Until very recently, the answer 
was probably not. Under the guise of protecting citizens from the 
state interference in the "private" family sphere, common law in this 
country permitted a husband to beat his wife, as long as the beating 
was not "excessive."99 In the 1870s, the women's movement and 
temperance activists called for legislation to eradicate wife abuse,l°O 
and by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a husband no longer 
had a "right" to beat his wife. Notwithstanding these legal changes, 
wife abuse continued to be justified or ignored by the police, courts, 
and general public.101 
By 1970, a coalition of feminist shelter workers, academics, and 
lawyers brought wife battering to public attention once again. 102 
concerns of having children from violent homes in the classroom. See BOULDER COUNTY 
SAFEHOUSE, WE CAN'T PLAy AT My HOUSE: CHILDREN AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, HANDBOOK 
FOR TEACHERS 6-8 (1990). 
96. On a national level, domestic violence costs employers from three to five billion 
dollars annually due to worker absenteeism. In addition, employers must deal with disruption 
and trauma that result from homicides and injuries that occur on the job. Homicide is the 
leading cause of death on the job for women. See NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION 
FuND, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1991 (S. 15/H.R. 1502): FACTS ON THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROVISION 3 (1991). 
97. Thirty percent of all women seeking treatment in hospital emergency rooms are 
victims of battering by a husband or boyfriend. Medical costs related to domestic abuse arc 
estimated at $100 million a year. Id. 
98. Martha Minow puts the question another way: "Can words stem violence? . . . Are 
there forms of expression that solicit humane responses and overcome restraints that hold 
people back from halting family violence? Finding languages to persuade judges. to empower 
victims, and to mobilize onlookers presents linked yet distinct difficulties." Minow, supra note 
11, at 1665-66. This Article asks a somewhat narrower question: can particular words-the 
stories of victims-help in developing an effective legal response to domestic violence? 
99. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 2 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 157-58 (1824) (Supreme Court 
of Mississippi affirming ancient English common law by granting husband the right to chas-
tise his wife as long as punishment was "moderate" according to generally accepted limits, 
such as beating with a "whip or rattan, ... no bigger than [a) thumb"). 
100. See Ellen C. Dubois & Linda Gordon, Seeking Ecstasy on the Battlefield: Danger 
and Pleasure in Nineteenth-Century Feminist Sexual Thought, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: Ex-
PLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 31. 42 (Carole S. Vance ed .• 1984); Elizabeth Pleck, Wife Beat-
ing in Nineteenth-Century America, in VICTIMOLOGY 60, 60-61 (1979). 
101. See ELIZABETH PLECK, DoMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL 
POUCY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TiMEs TO THE PRESENT (1987). 
102. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUG-
GLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982); Kathleen J. Tierney, The Battered 
Women's Movement and the Creation of Wife Beating Problem, 29 SOC. PROBS. 207 (1982). 
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Much has been written about the role of the women's movement in 
defining the problem of domestic violence and advocating for the 
support and protection of its victims.103 Feminist activists during the 
last two decades have created a movement that has both provided 
help and support to battered women, and worked to challenge and 
change political institutions that perpetuate domestic violence. This 
advocacy has taken the form of grass-roots efforts to develop an 
underground network of shelters and safe houses, and specialized 
units for dealing with victims of domestic violence in social service 
agencies, police departments, and prosecuting offices. 1M 
Feminist scholars have illuminated the dynamics of power and 
gender, and have developed legal theories which reflect and value 
women's experiences. Feminist theory helped other scholars and prac-
titioners to recognize that women's experience of violence in their 
homes and in their relationships is critical to an understanding of 
women's oppression. Building on the work of feminist legal theory, 
new laws and policies aimed at protecting victims of domestic vio-
lence have been adopted across the country over the last ten to fifteen 
years. The legal approaches taken to protect battered women and 
control family violence include: (1) creating new criminal sanctions to 
fit the patterns of domestic violence, (2) encouraging the enforcement 
of existing criminal sanctions in domestic situations, and (3) expand-
ing civil remedies for protection from domestic violence, particularly 
the development of the civil protection order. 
On the criminal side, studies revealed that the police were reluc-
tant to respond to battered women's callslo5 and that battered 
women's experiences were sometimes trivialized as "non-crimes" by 
prosecutors and judges.106 Such actions (or non-actions) were the 
103. See GORDON. supra note 93. 
104. See. e.g., Del Martin. The Historical Roots of Domestic Violence. in DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE REsPONSE 16 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa 
eds .• 1992). 
105. See Sarah F. Berk & Donileen R. Loseke. "Handling" Family Violence: Situational 
Determinants of Police Arrest in Domestic Disturbances. 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 317, 319 
(1981); Lee H. Bowker. Police Services to Battered Women: Bad or Not So Bad? 9 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAv. 476. 477-78 (1982); see also Kathleen Waits. The Criminal Justice System's 
Reponse to Battering: Understanding the Problems. Forging Solutions. 60 WASH. L. REv. 
267. 299 (1985). 
106. See Elizabeth A. Stanko, Would You Believe this Woman? Prosecutorial Screening 
for "Credible" Witnesses and a Problem of Justice. in JUDGE, LAWYER, VICTIM. THIEF: 
WOMEN. GENDER ROLES. AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 63 (Nicole H. Rafter & Elizabeth A. 
Stanko eds .• 1982); THE VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION 
AND DISPOSmON IN NEW YORK CITY's COURTS 28 (1977). 
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focus of suits filed against prosecutors and police departments. 107 
Partly because of these suits, and partly as a result of the release of 
important findings from the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Exper-
iment,108 a dramatic shift occurred in urban police department poli-
cies for responding to violence among family members. In 1984, ten 
percent of the departments surveyed said arrest was their preferred 
policy, but by 1986, this figure had risen to forty-three percent of the 
police departments.1oo Many of the changes were mandated by legis-
lation, including statutes requiring police training in domestic vio-
lence,lIo providing for mandatory and/or warrantless arrests of 
batterers,111 and providing for mandatory arrests for restraining order 
violations.1\2 States also enacted legislation targeted at the criminal 
courts' handling of family violence.113 This legislation included laws 
making marital rape a crimell4 and permitting the admission of bat-
tered spouse syndrome testimony in the defense of cases where wom-
en have been charged with killing or injuring their abuser. 11S 
107. See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) 
(where a woman who had been viciously attacked by her estranged husband sued police on 
equal protection grounds; court held that both acts and omissions by police are subject to the 
equal protection clause). 
108. See Lawrence W. Shennan & Ellen G. Cohn. The Impact of Research on Legal 
Policy: The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment. 23 LAW & SOC. REv. 117. 125 
(1989). 
109. See Lawrence W. Shennan & Richard A. Berk. The Specific Deterrent Effects of Ar-
rest for Domestic Assault. 49 AM. Soc. REv. 261 (1984). 
110. By the early 19805. seven states mandated domestic violence training for police: 
Alaska, Illinois. Maine. Nebraska, Ohio. Washington, and Wisconsin; two states. Nevada and 
Virginia, had legislation encouraging such training. JOSEPH J. COSTA, ABUSE OF WOMEN: 
LEGISLATION. REPORTING. AND PREvENTION 54-55 (1983). 
Ill. As of September 1988, there were only two states where police were not empow-
ered to make warrantless probable cause misdemeanor arrests in family violence cases, and 
ten states had passed mandatory arrest legislation for family violence cases. VICTIM SERVICES 
AGENCY, THE LAW ENFoRCEMENT REsPONSE TO FAMILY VIOLENCE: A STATE BY STATE 
GUIDE TO FAMILY VIOLENCE LEGISLATION 2-4 (1988). 
112. As of September 1988, eight states mandated arrest for restraining order violations: 
Iowa, Maine, Minnesota. Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at 
7-8. 
113. See Daisy Quarm & Martin D. Schwartz. Domestic Violence in Criminal Court: An 
Examination of New Legislation in Ohio, 4 WOMEN & PoL. 29. 29-30 (1985); Daisy Quarm 
& Martin D. Schwartz, Legal Refonn and the Criminal Court: The Case of Domestic Vio-
lence, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 199, 200-02 (1983). 
114. See WOMEN, VIOLENCE, & THE LAw: A FACT SHEET, supra note 87. at 2 (stating 
that approximately 14 states make marital rape a crime, while nearly 36 states do not protect 
women from marital rape). 
115. In 1991, 16 states admitted testimony of abuse as well as expert testimony on the 
battered spouse syndrome as a result of case law, and only two states provided for admission 
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On the civil side, new laws include statutes permitting or requir-
ing that spousal abuse be considered in custody and/or visitation deci-
sions,1I6 and civil protection or restraining order statutes. Jl7 While 
criminal prosecution may ultimately be the most effective option for 
preventing future abuse, it is not always an effective alternative to the 
civil protection order. First, in most criminal cases, it will take many 
months before the case comes to trial or is otherwise resolved, leav-
ing the victim unprotected during the pendency of the action. In addi-
tion, some violence in domestic relationships does not rise to the 
level of criminal activity for which serious prosecution will result. 
Because the standard of proof is higher in a criminal proceeding than 
in a civil proceeding, juries may not convict batterers unless there has 
been a significant level of violence. 
Do these laws make a difference? The answer is complex. The 
studies are still being done. As noted, statutes and policies designed 
to protect victims of domestic violence were not enacted until the 
mid-1970s, and many have been enacted only within the last few 
years. IIS 
With respect to statutes aimed at criminal prosecution of 
batterers, the studies generally indicate that treating domestic violence 
as a crime is the best deterrent available.1I9 Thus, studies have indi-
cated those statutes aimed at enhancing criminal prosecu-
tion-warrantless arrest, marital rape and mandatory arrest stat-
utes-protect victims, and, to a lesser extent, deter family vio-
of such testimony by statute. Judith Wolfer et al .• Battered Spouse Syndrome: Legal Reform. 
24 MD. BJ. 29, 29-30 (1991). 
116. Ten states and the District of Columbia require that spouse abuse be considered in 
custody decisions: Alaska. Arizona. California. Colorado, Florida, Illinois. Kentucky, Iowa, 
Texas, and Washington. WOMEN, VIOLENCE, & TIlE LAW: A FACT SHEET. supra note 87, at 
2. 
117. All 50 states and the District of Columbia now have some form of protection order 
statute. PETER FiNN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: 
LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICES. AND ENFORCEMENT (1990) (since its publication, 
Delaware and Arkansas have enacted civil protection order statutes). Statutes typically provide 
for eviction of the abuser from the home, temporary child custody, and a prohibition against 
continued abuse. Some state statutes provide for monetary relief for the duration of the order. 
The duration of the order varies with each state and ranges from 60 days to 3 years. 
118. Before 1976, only two jurisdictions, New York and the District of Columbia. had 
enacted restraining order legislation specifically concerning battered women. See Janice L. 
Grau, Restraining Order Legislation for Battered Women, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 703, 704 n.5 
(1982); Janice L. Grau et al .• Restraining Orders for Battered Women: Issues of Access and 
Efficacy, 4 WOMEN & POL. 13, 14 (1984). 
119. See Sherman & Cohn, supra note 108, at 118. 
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lence.12o 
Civil protection orders can also be effective. There is some evi-
dence that this kind of civil remedy can be effective as a short-term 
measure to protect the victim if the statute is properly drafted. 121 
Comprehensive statutes can provide victims with a quick, easily ac-
cessible remedy to plan for alternative housing, financial relief, and 
obtain counseling while pursuing more long term solutions to the 
problem such as divorce or relocation. 
Men's violence toward women cannot, obviously, be eradicated 
by legal reform-the cultural and historical roots for such behavior 
are too deep-seated. l22 But the evidence is clear that the legal ap-
proaches described can be effective in offering some protection for 
battered women and controlling family violence. The question, then, 
becomes what are effective strategies in accomplishing these kinds of 
legal reform? 
Scholars like Martha Mahoney,l23 Christine Littleton,124 and 
Martha Minowl2S have argued for the use of narratives to transform 
the way the legal system regards the battering relationship. Martha 
Mahoney has written about her own experience with domestic vio-
lence and that of others to offer alternatives to the dominant cultural 
and legal characterization of battered women. She argues that the 
prevailing image of battered women is drawn primarily from a preoc-
cupation by both the media and legal decision-makers with the bat-
tered women who kill.126 She acknowledges that the psychological 
theory underlying "battered women's syndrome" accurately describes 
experiences common to many battered women. It is also, in a behav-
ioral sense, a very important tool for explaining those experiences to 
the court in a context in which the stakes are very high. Mahoney's 
120. Sherman & Berk, supra note 109. at 270. 
121. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 84, at 210-12; Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, 
Do Restraining Orders Help? Battered Women's Experience with Male Violence and Legal 
Process, in DoMESTIC VIOLENCE 227 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992); Grau 
et al., supra note 118, at 19-20 (this slUdy, however, concluded that protection orders are 
most effective in curtailing abuse when the level of violence is not severe); Lisa G. Lerman, 
A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 61, 70 n.35 
(1984). 
122. See, e.g., CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); CAROL SMART, 
FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF TIiE LAW (1989). 
123. See Mahoney, supra note 12. 
124. See Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: 
Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23. 
125. See Minow, supra note 11. 
126. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 34-43. 
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concern, however, is that this preoccupation with battered women who 
kill their abusers focuses on the battered woman's psychological 
makeup, depicting "an image of utterly dysfunctional women."m As 
such, it reinforces stereotypes and focuses attention on the responses 
of the relatively few women who kill their batterers, rather than a 
much more universal dynamic in domestic violence-power and con-
trol marked by violence and coercion. 
This distortion of the image of victims of domestic violence has 
had negative effects on the efforts to make the law more responsive 
to the needs of battered women. Mahoney suggests a particular strate-
gy to change both the legal and cultural definitions of domestic vio-
lence-redefining as "separation assault" the "particular assault on a 
woman's body and volition that seeks to block her from leaving, 
retaliate for her departure, or forcibly end the separation."128 She il-
lustrates the "common thread" created by this phenomena called "sep-
aration assault" through seven stories, including her own, of violence 
in the ordinary lives of women. 
In addition to identifying legal change strategies to redefine 
separation, these stories do much more. Traditional legal discourse 
and social science literature tell us that domestic violence is at the 
same time both widespread and aberrant. Battering is described as "a 
unique and almost mysterious area of human response and behavior" 
and "beyond the ken of the average lay[person]."129 The stories 
Martha Mahoney has collected help to eliminate that contradiction. 
Domestic violence is widespread, and it needs to be viewed in the 
context of the continuum of violence and power exerted over women 
in their daily lives. The stories in Mahoney's piece allow us to make 
connections with these women, and to understand our own experience 
in relation to their experiences. Even if we have not been victims of 
physical abuse at the hands of our intimate partners, we recognize 
ourselves in the stories of these women. These are women with var-
ied backgrounds, women whose experiences defy the stereotype of the 
127. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 39; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing 
alld Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Batter-
ing, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 195 (1986); Lenore E. Walker, A Response to Elizabeth M. 
Schneider's Describing and Changing. 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 223 (1986). 
128. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 6. 
129. [d. at 11 (citing Sinns v. State, 283 S.E.2d 479, 481 (Ga. 1981); Ibn-Tamas v. 
United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1979». For sociai science definitions of battering 
that Mahoney describes as "incident focused," see ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOM-
EN KILL (1987); MILDRED D. PAGELOW. WOMAN-BATTERING: VICTIMS AND THEIR ExPERI-
ENCES 29-34 (1981); WALKER, supra note 84, at xv. 
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passive, grotesquely beaten victim. Their stories, particularly the de-
scriptions of their commitment to their partners and their profound 
attachment to their children, offer some insight into the persistent 
question: why don't they leave? 
Perhaps more importantly, the stories Mahoney has collected 
speak more generally to the vulnerability of all women to violence 
and oppression. As such, these stories and stories like them are an 
essential element of a social change strategy aimed at making legal 
decision-makers recognize both the existence and closeness of the 
problem of domestic violence. This recognition is the key to motivat-
ing decision-makers to develop solutions that better reflect the dynam-
ics of power and control in domestic violence, and to encourage deci-
sion-makers to make a commitment to the meaningful implementation 
of the laws. 
B. A Case Study: Applying the Lessons of Narrative Scholarship 
In many ways, Maryland provides an ideal setting in which to 
test strategies for social change. Its demographics reveal a typical but 
diverse citizenry.l30 Although Maryland's policies and laws may be 
described as progressive on social issues in some areas, 131 it is a 
state with deeply-rooted religious traditions that have contributed to a 
very conservative approach to state regulation in the domestic 
sphere.132 
Although marriage is considered a civil contract between the 
parties and not a sacrament, the law regards it with a sanctity that is 
not attributed to any other kind of contract. \33 Maryland's highest 
court reaffirmed this in 1943, "on the theory that the public has a 
130. The State of Maryland is comprised of 25% urban, 57% suburban, and 18% rural 
areas. MARYLAND DEP'T OF EcON. & EMP. DEV., 1990-91 MARYLAND STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT 26-31. Its citizens are 63.7% registered Democrats and 28.1% registered Republicans. 
Id. at 266. Its population is 48.5% men and 51.5% women, and is 71 % white, 24.9% Afri-
can-American, and 4.1% other races. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE EcONOMIC AND STATISTICS 
ADMIN., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, PuB. No. 1990 CPH-I-22, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULA-
TION AND HOUSING-SUMMARY POPULATION AND HOUSING STATISTICS: MARYLAND 32 (1990). 
131. See generally Nancy S. Forster & Michael R. Braudes, The Common Law of Mary-
land: An Imponant and Independent Source of Criminal Law and Procedure, 3 MD. J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199 (1992) (exploring the ways in which Maryland common law 
confers greater rights upon criminal defendants than those provided by federal law). 
132. See generally Kenneth Lasson, Free Exercise in the Free State: Maryland's Role in 
the Development of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 81 (1988) (pro-
viding a brief overview of the religious history of Maryland). 
133. See Fornshill v. Murray, 1 Bland 479 (Md. 1828). 
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direct interest in [marriage] as an institution of transcendent impor-
tance to social welfare."I34 Indeed, until 1963, a marriage was not 
legal unless there was a religious ceremony.13S Moreover, 
Maryland's current two-year separation requirement for a no-fault di-
vorce is among the longest in the nation.l36 
Maryland is typical in the pervasiveness and extent of the do-
mestic violence that occurs within its borders. An estimated 150,000 
incidents of domestic violence occur in the state each year.137 From 
July 1991 to July 1992, almost sixty women and children were killed 
by abusive partners or males in parental roles. 138 Maryland provided 
only limited legal protection to victims of domestic violence until re-
cently.139 Prior to 1980, in order to obtain civil remedies-such as a 
restraining order or financial relief-for protection from domestic 
violence, a women had to initiate what is now known as a "limited 
134. Behr v. Behr, 30 A.2d 750, 752 (Md. 1943). 
135. See Dennison v. Dennison, 35 Md. 361, 379 (1872) (holding that "no maniage 
was • • . good and valid[] unless celebrated by some religious rites and ceremony"). The 
requirement that a religious ceremony be added to a civil contract was changed by statute in 
1963, authorizing the performance of maniage ceremonies by designated court clerks. See 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 2-406 (conduct of ceremonies), 2410 (fees). 
136. See Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Oven>iew, 25 FAM. 
L.Q. 417, 439 (1992). 
137. See Linen Smith, New Protection Order Can Keep Abused Spouses "Safe at Home", 
BALT. SUN, May 18, 1992, at IC. According to Maryland State Police records, in 1990 there 
were approximately 16,000 reported cases of spousal assault. MARYLAND BATTERED SPOUSE 
PROGRAM, MARYLAND UNIFORM CRIME REPORT PROGRAM, BATTERED SPOUSE REPORT 83 
(1990). This figure, however, grossly underestimates the number of victims. Many domestic 
assaults are handled on an informal basis, resulting in incomplete or inaccurate reporting; in 
some cases, domestic assaults are taken directly to the court system and are never reported to 
a police department. [d. at 81. Only 10% to 50% of adult victims ever can the police, and 
when cans are made, only one jurisdiction out of twenty-four requires written reports. MARY-
LAND ALLIANCE AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE, BROKEN BODIES, BROKEN SPIRITS 2 (1991) 
[hereinafter BROKEN BODlESJ. For example, Baltimore City police received over 60,000 calls 
for domestic violence in 1993. JANN JACKSON, HOUSE OF RUTH, 1993 BALTIMORE CITY 
PoUCE DATA (1994). 
138. Telephone Interview with Jean MacLeod, Coordinator of Community Education, 
Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence. Mar. 8, 1993. 
139. For a brief period during the 19th century, Maryland's laws contained an explicit 
prohibition against "wife-beating" and prescribed a specific punishment. In 1882, in response 
to a series of incidents in which women were injured by their husbands, a law was passed 
which provided that a husband found guilty of punishing his wife with physical force would 
be "sentenced to be whipped not exceeding forty lashes. or imprisoned for a term not ex-
ceeding one year, or both." Act of March 30, 1882, ch. 120, 1882 MD. LAws 120 (corporal 
punishment of persons found guilty of "wife-beating"). The law was applied with great fan-
fare in a few widely publicized cases, and was repealed in 1953. Act of April 11, 1953, ch. 
411, 1953 MD. LAWS 744; see also George Gipe, Wife-Beaters of the Past Sometimes Got 
Beaten Themseh·es. BALT. SUN, March 26, 1977 at A6. 
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divorce."I40 In order to obtain a limited divorce, the victim had to 
obtain an agreement from her husband or prove in court that her hus-
band committed acts amounting to cruelty, excessively vicious con-
duct, or desertion.141 This remedy, unavailable to unmarried intimate 
partners,142 involved substantial legal fees and much delay, from the 
filing of the complaint to the hearing in which the plaintiff and cor-
roborating witness were required to appear and testify.143 Although 
many states now permit divorce on the ground of "irreconcilable 
differences" or "irretrievable breakdown" or without any required 
separation, Maryland's no fault ground for divorce still requires a two 
year separation before filing. 144 
On the criminal side, prior to 1984, Maryland limited a victim's 
remedies to attempting prosecution for traditional crimes, such as 
assault andlor battery,14s harassment,146 theft, 147 false im-
140. A limited divorce is equivalent to the divorce a mensa et thoro, which is literally 
translated as "a divorce from table and bed:' but is more commonly referred to as "a divorce 
from bed and board." The divorce is limited in that, although the parties are legally separated 
and are in fact forbidden to live or cohabit together, there is no severance of the marital 
bonds. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 480 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "limited divorce" as a '1udi-
cial separation of husband and wife not dissolving the marriage tie"). 
141. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-102 (1992). 
142. Unmarried intimate partners are often victims of domestic violence. General studies 
and empirical data obtained from Maryland district courts confirm the prevalence of domestic 
violence in non-marital relationships. Of the Maryland district courts surveyed in 1991, ap-
proximately 33% of petitions for protection from domestic violence were denied based either 
on marital status or on the fact that the parties were not living together. ADVISORY COUNCIL 
ON FAMILY LEGAL NEEDS OF Low INCOME PERSONS, INCREASING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR 
MARYLAND FAMILIES 20-21 (1992) [hereinafter INCREASING ACCESS TO JUSTICE]. Approxi-
mately 72% of both police and hospital emergency reports of domestic violence occur in 
cases in which the victim is not currently residing with the abuser, either because the parties 
are divorced or separated, or because the parties have never lived together. Lerman, supra 
note 121. at 74 n.52 (citing E. STARK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., WIFE 
ABUSE IN THE MEDICAL SE'ITlNG (1980»: see also Desiree French, When Unwed Panners 
Tum to Violence, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 1989, at 25-26 (stating that most domestic vio-
lence calls to the Boston Police Department's Domestic Violence Assistance Unit concemed 
unmarried people, and that physical assaults may be more severe among these cohabiting cou-
ples than among married couples). 
143. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-101(b) (1992) (requiring corroborating witness to 
obtain divorce); MD. CODE ANN., MD. RULES, Rule S75 (Michie 1993) (requiring testimony 
to obtain a divorce). 
144. Walker, supra note 136, at 439-40. In Maryland, a two year period is required 
where the parties did not separate by mutual consent; where the separation is voluntary the 
parties must live apart one year before filing. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 7-103 (1992). 
145. "Assault" is an ''unlawful offer or attempt, coupled with an apparent present ability, 
to commit a violent injury on the person of another." 2 WEST'S MARYLAND LAW ENCYCLO-
PEDIA 537 (West 1960). "Battery" is a completed assault, consisting of ''the unpermitted ap-
plication of trauma by one person upon any part of the body of another person . . . . The 
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prisonment,148 and child abuse.149 Although widely recognized as a 
common component of domestic abuse/so until 1989 rape was not a 
crime in Maryland when the victim was married to the abuser. IS I In 
addition, criminal enforcement of the applicable crimes was inconsis-
tent and often didn't happen-refusal to treat domestic violence as a 
crime persists throughout the process from arrest to prosecution.ls2 
Although enactment of statutes to protect victims of violence 
began nationwide in the early 1960s through the mid-1970s,ls3 
Maryland did not begin to enact explicit legal remedies for domestic 
violence until 1980. 
As in many other states, the groundwork for domestic violence 
law reform in Maryland was laid by grassroots organizations whose 
primary goal was to provide shelter for victims. In 1975, the Mary-
land Commission for Women issued a report which identified the 
problem of domestic violence, and modestly proposed the use of a 
vacant Catholic convent in Baltimore as a small, temporary shelter for 
abused women.IS4 Despite the worthy intentions of the drafters of 
the report, the report also included a more ambitious proposal that 
reflected the stereotypes regarding victims of domestic violence still 
mere willful placing of a hand upon or the purposeful touching of the person of another. or 
something intimately connected with another. is sufficient to commit the battery." RICHARD P. 
GILBERT ET AL., MARYLAND TORT HANDBOOK § 3.1 (2d ed. 1992). 
146. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121A (1992). 
147. ''Theft'' is "[t)he taking of property without the owner's consent." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 1324 (5th ed. 1979). See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 340-44 (1992). 
148. "False imprisonment" is the "unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty 
of another." 11 WEST'S MARYLAND LAw ENCYCLOPEDIA 75 (1961). "False imprisonment is 
any deprivation of the liberty of a person, without hislher consent, whether by force, threats 
or otherwise • • • • False imprisonment may occur by means other than physical force." GIL-
BERT ET AL., supra note 145. at 35; see also Watkins v. State, 478 A.2d 326, 336 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1984). 
149. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (1992). 
150. One study found that over 33% of women who appeared at shelters for battered 
women reported that they had been raped by their husbands. Other studies found that be-
tween 10% and 14% of married women have been raped by their husband. The statistics 
available probably grossly underestimate the actual incidence of marital rape given the fact 
that many women feel too humiliated to discuss the issue, or know that reporting the rape 
would be useless since rape committed in marriage does not exist as a matter of legal defini-
tion in most states. Testimony of Sharon Grosfeld Before Maryland House judiciary Commit-
tee, Special Hearing on Rape and Sexual Offenses Prosecution (1987). 
151. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 464D (1992). 
152. See BROKEN BOOtES, supra note 137, at 6-8. 
153. See Grau et al., supra note 118, at 14. 
154. Sharon Dickman, Some Women Put Up with Abuse. BALT. SUN, Mar. 29, 1976 at 
CI. 
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prevalent in Maryland in 1975. The proposal was to create a much 
larger shelter in a building used by the city's public hospital, to ac-
commodate not only domestic violence victims, but teenage runaways 
and women suffering from mental illness as well. ISS Assumptions 
that were made regarding the common problems of these groups of 
women tended to reinforce negative stereotypes about victims of 
domestic violence. Funding for this proposal, however, was never 
obtained. 
Throughout the 1970s, efforts to assist battered women were 
made primarily by a coalition of women's organizations whose prin-
cipal goal continued to be establishing a shelter. At that time, the 
only emergency housing available for women was the Salvation Army 
for five dollars a night. Those who could not afford the Salvation 
Army were forced to seek shelter in public parks or bus terminals. 
The limited goal of a small, safe shelter was realized in 1977 when 
the House of Ruth was established in a three-story rowhouse in Balti-
more. The shelter offered counselling and temporary shelter to ap-
proximately twenty-five women and children who were victims of 
domestic violence.lS6 Funding to start and operate the shelter for its 
first year came entirely from private donations and volunteer staff. 
Although the Maryland Legislature had passed a bill in 1977 calling 
for the opening of a model shelter for battered spouses in a heavily 
populated section of Maryland, no money had been budgeted for the 
project. 157 
Throughout this period, the primary strategy for achieving legis-
lative and other reforms was to gather statistics in order to demon-
strate the existence of the problem to a skeptical public.ls8 Female 
attorneys at Maryland's Legal Aid Bureau began the effort to main-
155. Id. at CI-C2. 
156. The House of Ruth, modeled on an organization with the same name in Washing-
ton, D.C., takes its name from the biblical story depicting the intense loyalty of Ruth for her 
mother-in-law Naomi. See Andrea Pawlyna, A Refuge for Beaten Women, BALT. SUN, Jan. I, 
1978, "Trend" sec., at 1. 
157. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-515 (1992). 
158. Pauline Menes, a Maryland legislator who would sponsor major reform in this area, 
noted at the time: "Much needs to be done in dealing with the battered spouse, but without 
a knowledgeable base (of statistics), every step along the way would be impossible to 
achieve." Dickman, supra note 154, at C2. Menes believed that statistics would better define 
the issue and bolster legislation that would protect the spouse in certain situations. Id. It was 
not until late 1978 that the state finally provided financial support specifically for services to 
battered women in the form of a Department of Human Resources $50,000 grant. House of 
Ruth Awarded $50,000 State Grant, BALT. EVENING SUN, Aug. 21, 1978, at Cl. 
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tain these statistics, helping to raise public consciousness about the 
issue. In 1978, the Maryland Legislature finally took a modest step to 
document the problem by directing the state police to conduct a sur-
vey to document the number of domestic assaults reported to the 
police.1S9 
The inadequacy of focusing on statistics alone as a social change 
strategy is demonstrated by the findings of this early survey in 
Maryland. First, it reported that there were approximately 13,500 
assaults against Maryland women by their domestic partners,l60 a 
number we now know grossly understates the statewide incidence of 
domestic assaults.161 The survey also reported that 11.2% of the vic-
tims were men,162 a figure that substantially overestimates the num-
bers of male victims of domestic violence.163 The survey also found 
that most of the assaults occurred while couples were living togeth-
er. l64 In fact, subsequent data collected in both Maryland165 and 
nationall66 studies demonstrate that women are at greatest risk when 
they first separate from their abusers. The survey also found that 
most victims were white, and were between twenty-five and twenty-
nine years of age.l67 Again, these figures distort the reality of do-
mestic violence victims who transcend all racial and age groups. 168 
In 1980, the Maryland General Assembly passed legislation to 
provide for a civil protection order for domestic violence victims.l69 
The coverage of the statute, however, was restricted to married indi-
viduals, and limited the duration of relief under the statute to fifteen 
days. The hearings and lobbying surrounding the narrow reform fo-
cused on victims' stories in only the most indirect way.170 Advo-
159. HJ. Res. 78 (1976). 
160. Judith Valente. Domestic Violence Surveyed • .. , WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1979. at 
C1. 
161. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
162. Valente, supra note 160, at C1. 
163. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
164. Valente, supra note 160, at C1. 
165. INCREASING ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 142, at 20-21 (citing studies in three 
Maryland jurisdictions showing that approximately 23% to 33% of victims seeking civil reme-
dies and 79% those seeking criminal remedies for injuries sustained from former or current 
husbands or boyfriends were not living with their abusers). 
166. See CYNTHIA GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 160-62 (1989); ANN JONES, WOMEN 
WHO Kn.L 298-99 (1980). 
167. Valente, supra note 160, at C1. 
168. See WALKER, supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
169. Protection from Domestic Violence Act, Md. H.B. 1945 (1980). 
170. See List of Speakers and Interested Parties Before House Judiciary Committee on 
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cates felt that "anecdotes" about victims' lives would not be well-re-
ceived by legislators.171 Legislators who considered the legislation at 
the time relied more on their own experience and that of "trusted 
colleagues." .172 
Relatively minor amendments were made to the billl73 but it re-
mained among the most narrow protection order statutes of the 49 
statutes surveyed by the National Institute of Justice in 1988.174 The 
only other reform that occurred during this period was that Maryland 
expressly authorized police to make warrantless arrests of batterers, 
but only where the battery had been committed against a spouse or 
another individual with whom the batterer resides.17S 
In early 1989, Maryland began a shift-from being among the 
worst states in the nation in the level of legal protection provided to 
victims of abuse to becoming a state that has begun to deal with the 
problem of domestic violence in both a comprehensive and innovative 
fashion. 
1. The Gender Bias Report: Storytelling Through Public 
Testimony 
In 1989, Maryland's Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in 
the Courts (the "Committee"), a joint effort of the judiciary and bar 
of Maryland, issued the "Report on Gender Bias" rmding that "gender 
bias exists in the courts of Maryland, and it affects decision-making 
as well as participants.,,176 In conducting its investigation, the Report 
H.B. 1945 (1980). 
171. Telephone Interview with Judith Wolfer, Fonner Legal Director of the House of 
Ruth Domestic Violence Legal Clinic and member of the Public Justice Center Domestic 
Violence Task Force (Aug. 25, 1992). 
172. Interview with the Honorable J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, 
in Balt., Md. (Sept. 27 1992) (notes on file with the author). 
173. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 to -510 (1984) (as amended 1987 & 
1991). 
174. FiNN & COLSON, supra note 117, at 16-17. 
175. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 594B (1987 & Supp. 1991). 
176. MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMlITEE, REPORT ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 
(1989) [hereinafter REPORT ON GENDER BIAS], reprinted in Maryland Special Joint Commit-
tee, Report of the Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts, 20 U. BALT. L. 
REv. I, 6 (1990). In recent years many other states and state court systems have studied 
gender bias in the judicial system and made similar findings. See, e.g., NEW YORK TASK 
FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, UNIFIED CT. Sys. ST. N.Y., REPORT OF THE NEW YORK 
TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURT (1986), reprinted in New York Task Force on 
Women in the Courts, Unified Ct. Sys. St. N.Y., Report of the New York Task Force on 
Women in the Court, 15 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 8 (1986-87); SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF 
MAsSACHUSETTS, GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE COURT SYSTEM IN MAssACHUSETTS (1989); 
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on Gender Bias relied on surveys of judges, lawyers, and court per-
sonnel. But what makes the report so persuasive and powerful a tool 
for social change are the stories the Committee heard and reported 
about gender bias, particularly as it relates to victims of domestic 
violence. As the report describes it: 
The most compelling and moving testimony which [the Committee] 
received during its hearings throughout the State concerned domestic 
violence. Victims, friends of victims, and advocates for victims 
repeatedly impressed the Committee members with the severity and 
pervasiveness of the problem of domestic violence and the critical 
need to find and enforce effective remedies.177 
One story described a victim's attempt to get help after her husband 
had threatened her for a year. She described to the Committee her 
reaction to a judge's refusal to believe her story: 
The thing that has never left my mind from that point to now is 
what the judge said to me. He took a few minutes to decide on the 
matter and he looked at me and he said, "I don't believe anything 
that you're saying." He said, ''The reason I don't believe it is be-
cause 1 don't believe that anything like this could happen to me. If 
1 was you and someone had threatened me with a gun, there is no 
way that I would continue to stay with them. There is no way that 
I could take that kind of abuse from them. Therefore, since I would 
not let that happen to me, 1 can't believe that it happened to you." 
I have just never forgotten those words . . . . When I left the court-
room that day, I felt very defeated, very defenseless, and very pow-
erless and very hopeless, because not only had I gone through an 
experience which I found to be very overwhelming, very trying and 
almost cost me my life, but to sit up in court and make myself 
open up and recount all my feelings and fear and then have it 
thrown back in my face as being totally untrue just because this big 
man would not allow anyone to do this to him, placed me in a state 
of shock which probably hasn't left me yet.178 
This testimony-and similar testimony from other vic-
tims-played a significant role in persuading members of the Com-
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, THE 
FINAL REPoRT OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR GENDER FAIRNESS IN 
THE COURTS (1989). reprinted in Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness 
in the Courts, Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts: 
Final Report, 15 WM. MITCHElL L. REv. 825 (1989). 
177. REPoRT ON GENDER BIAS, supra note 176, at 10. 
178. ld. at 11-12. 
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mittee to recommend significant reform in the legal system's response 
to domestic violence in Maryland.179 In fact, in any number of con-
texts, this story does more to inform the reader or listener about the 
impact of gender bias on victims of domestic violence than abstract 
legal arguments, statistics, or the extensive research findings in social 
science literature. I have seen its power, both in my efforts to prepare 
law school clinical students to represent victims of domestic violence 
and in my efforts to persuade judges and lawmakers about the need 
to educate and improve domestic violence laws. ISO 
2. Stories from Prison: The Clemency Petition and A Plea for 
Justice 
Another development involving the creative use of stories to ac-
complish law reform on domestic violence issues began shortly after 
the issuance of the Report on Gender Bias. In early 1989, a coalition 
of domestic violence advocates in Maryland, seeking to promote sys-
temic reforms to benefit victims of domestic violence, began to ex-
plore new social change strategies for law reform in the area. lSI The 
primary focus of the work of the coalition was to improve the plight 
of domestic violence victims who had killed their batterers, and who 
faced unique legal barriers in their criminal trials. 
Prior to 1991, in Maryland, a woman being tried for killing her 
batterer was often unable to tell her story at trial.182 Trial judges, 
relying on the traditional common law of self defense, refused to hear 
testimony about domestic violence and battered spouse syndrome, 
finding that if the woman was the first aggressor, evidence of her 
179. Interview with Professor Karen Czapanskiy, Associate Professor at the University of 
Maryland School of Law and Reporter of the Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the 
Courts, in Washington, D.C. (October 2, 1992). 
180. The author was project director for the Attorney General's Advisory Council on 
Family Legal Needs of Low Income Persons. a state-wide task force composed of legislators. 
judges, practicing lawyers. and litigants which issued a report recommending. among other 
things, dramatic reform in the state's civil remedies for victims of domestic violence. Su 
INCREASING ACCESS TO JUSTICE. supra note 142, at 19-30. In addition. the author served as 
consultant to the Special Ad Hoc Committee to Implement the 1992 Domestic Violence Law. 
a committee appointed by the Chief Judge, Court of Appeals of Maryland, to assist in educa-
tion and preparation of forms to implement Maryland's amended civil protection order statute. 
181. The coalition included the Domestic Violence Task Force from the Public Justice 
Center (a Maryland non-profit corporation organized to engage in law reform efforts to pro-
tect and expand the legal rights of the underrepresented), the House of Ruth, Inc. (Maryland's 
oldest and most comprehensive domestic violence program). and faculty and students from the 
University of Maryland School of Law's clinical programs. 
182. See Wolfer et al., supra note 115, at 31. 
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state of mind was irrelevant. 183 Demoralized, victimized women 
were viewed as aggressors because they typically killed after a beat~ 
ing was over. 
This rigid adherence to the traditional common law of self de-
fense prevented women from telling the stories of their abuse and 
prevented experts from testifying about the condition known as "bat-
tered spouse syndrome." Battered spouse syndrome is a complex 
condition in which victims are controlled through systemic violence 
and are rendered psychologically incapable of escape.l84 Both the 
victim's testimony about the abuse she experienced and expert testi-
mony on battered spouse syndrome would help the finder of fact 
understand why a woman might use lethal force against her batterer 
at a time when he was vulnerable. When women take the desperate 
step of killing their abusers, they generally do so during a lull be-
tween violent episodes. The testimony about the syndrome's effects 
from both the victim and the expert witness can help a jury under-
stand why a woman might have believed she was in imminent dan-
ger, or why she did not leave an abusive relationship. 
In order to remedy the inequities of the law, the coalition sought 
to bring the stories of women who had killed their batterers to the 
attention of legal decision-makers. The broader goals were to (1) 
educate the legal community about the dynamics of domestic vio-
lence, (2) change existing law in Maryland which excluded evidence 
of domestic violence and expert testimony on the battered spouse 
syndrome so that future defendants would be able to tell their stories 
at trial, and (3) ameliorate the harsh results of existing law by obtain-
ing the early release of certain incarcerated battered women who were 
unable to tell their stories of abuse and who did not have the benefit 
of expert testimony on domestic violence at their trialS.18S 
183. See. e.g .• Friend v. State. No. 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Dec. 12, 1988) (ex-
cluding "baltered wife syndrome" testimony based upon the court's preliminary finding, with-
out the benefit of expert testimony of evidence concerning prior abuse. that the woman was 
the first aggressor); Kriscumas v. State. No. 1072 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed July 9, 1987) 
(same). 
184. See BROWNE, supra note 129, at 177. 
185. See Wolfer et al .• supra note 115, at 30. Martha Mahoney has criticized the dis-
torted cultural images of victims of domestic violence. See generally Mahoney, supra note 
12. In light of this critique, the focus on the plight of baltered women who kill may be seen 
as a strategical choice that could have a negative impact on creating legal remedies for the 
vast majority of victims of domestic violence who do not fight back. This chronicle of 
Maryland's experience. however, demonstrates that the storytelling strategy in this law reform 
campaign had a positive impact on other areas of domestic violence law reform. 
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Prior efforts to accomplish these goals through litigationl86 and 
legislationl87 had failed. Creative new strategies were needed. The 
coalition shifted the focus to storytelling-having victims who had 
killed or attempted to kill their abusers tell the grim stories of their 
lives with their abusers-in a variety of ways, to a number of audi-
ences. These stories were told in three principle ways: on videotape, 
during one-on-one meetings, and in written or live testimony. First, 
the Domestic Violence Task Force arranged for the financing and 
production of a videotape, A Plea for Justice. The objective of the 
videotape was to have victims tell their stories to a wide audience, 
thereby 
[creating] an intellectual and emotional understanding of the battered 
woman's syndrome which will lead to action in many sectors .... 
[The] long range objectives include showing the videotape to legis-
lators, Parole Commissioners, the Governor, battered women's advo-
cates, battered women, batterers and the general public . . . . Our 
specific measurable objectives include getting domestic violence 
legislation passed and securing parole release for certain inmates at 
[the Maryland Correctional Institution for Women]. We further in-
tend to screen the videotape at programs for battered women and 
batterers around the state and around the nation. We will also seek 
television broadcast of the videotape for exposure to the general 
public. Our objective in terms of battered women, batterers and the 
general public is to create an understanding of the battered woman's 
syndrome which will help people break the cycle of violence before 
it results in the tragedy of death. 188 
In May 1990, the thirty-minute videotape, one of the first of its 
kind, was completed and premiered to a large audience in Balti-
more.189 Representatives from the coalition interviewed thirty women 
186. See supra note 183. 
187. Legislation regarding the admissibility of battered spouse syndrome testimony had 
been introduced before Maryland's General Assembly in every legislative session since 1988. 
Although in 1990 several bills on the subject received much attention and publicity following 
their initial introduction, none of the bills got out of committee. See Wolfer et aI., supra 
note llS, at 29. 
188. PuBUC JUSTICE CENTER DoMESTIC VIOLENCE TASK FORCE, GRANT PROPOSAL TO 
TIlE ABELL FOUNDATION (excerpts on file with author) [hereinafter GRANT PRoPOSAL], quoted 
in PuBuc JUSTICE CENTER DoMESTIC VIOLENCE TASK FORCE, FACfS AND FINDINGS: AN 
UPDATE ON RESULTS ACHIEVED BY TIlE PuBuc JUSTICE CENTER DoMESTIC VIOLENCE TASK 
FORCE'S VIDEOTAPE "A PLEA FOR JUSTICE" (1991) [hereinafter FACfS AND FINDINGS]. 
189. Laura Lippman, Battered Women Hoping for Chance at a New Defense, BALT. 
EVENING SUN, May 14, 1990, at Cl. A Plea for Justice is an outstanding example of "elec-
tronic narrative." For an interesting discussion of the potential of this form of narrative, see 
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who had killed or attempted to kill their abusers and were serving 
time at Maryland's only women's prison, the Maryland Correctional 
Institution for Women (the "MCIW").I90 From these interviews, the 
stories of four Baltimore women-serving sentences ranging from 
fifteen years to life for killing their partners-were selected to feature 
in the film. With the exception of the narrator, a battered woman 
herself, and brief statements from psychologist Lenore Walker and 
former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, the voices in the film are 
those of the women telling their stories. 
The stories were classic examples of domestic violence. All of 
the women were products of abusive homes, and all had initially 
sought a haven within their relationships. The batterers began as 
"intense" and "passionate" partners. Later, this passion turned to vio-
lence and isolation, making the women totally dependent upon their 
abusers. The details of the stories vary, yet paint a horrifying picture 
of lives that led these women to believe that killing their abusers was 
their only chance to live. 
A former policewoman described the rape and other violence that 
she couldn't testify about during her trial, which ended with a convic-
tion and sentence of fifteen years for killing her husband: 
It started out first with the verbal threats. Started out with a 
lot of the pushing and shoving me. And urn, it just kept on pro-
gressing to, after the shoving and all, to the bear hugs, he would 
give me a bear hug. Because if I didn't want to listen to him, he 
would squeeze me so tight and he would just make me listen. And 
after the bear hugs it would start with the open hand slapping. I 
said, you know you are hitting me. I guess I didn't consider, at 
first, his bear hugs and pushing and shoving hitting-and he would 
say he wasn't hitting me either, 'cause he didn't lay his hands on 
me. 
He would hit me with anything. He would bite me allover. 
Pick up things and throw them at me and hit me with them. But I 
never went to the hospital for anything. It was too embarrassing. I 
was so determined that this was going to work if I would just stop 
and just make him happier. Change phone numbers, or even move, 
or act the way he wanted me to act. 
John Batt. Law. Science and Narrative: Reflections on Brain Science. Electronic Media. Story. 
and Law Learning, 40 J. LEGAL Eouc. 19. 40-46 (1990). 
190. See Interview with Judith Wolfer. fonner Legal Director of the House of Ruth D0-
mestic Violence Legal Clinic and member of the Public Justice Center Domestic Violence 
Task Force. in Baltimore. Md. (Aug. 31. 1992). 
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Sure, many people say why don't you just leave. But they 
don't understand. It's a sickness really. Being in that type of situa-
tion sometimes you are damned if you do leave because he's going 
to come after you. That's a fact. And if you stay, you know what 
you're going to put up with. So, sometimes, it's like I know what's 
going to happen to me, so when I leave, I don't know what he's 
going to do to me. Really. So I'm always looking behind my back. 
Many times my husband told me, if you leave me, you're going to 
look behind your back. You better watch out. And I believed him 
because I knew what he could do. 
Many times I thought I would die. Many times I didn't want 
to live anymore because of what was going on. I said, God, this 
will never end. I thought it wouldn't. Many times I said, if he don't 
kill me, I'm sure I'll kill myself, 'cause it was that painful. I know 
I want to live. No, I don't want to die. I don't want to have any-
body beat on me or threaten my life. 
I know I'm worth much, much more than I thought I was. I 
know I'm a good person and I got a lot to give and all this didn't 
have to happen to me. It doesn't have to happen to anybody else, 
either, because if I'm alive I'm going to tell somebody that they 
don't have to go through what I went through. They don't have to 
die and they don't have to be incarcerated, either.191 
A second woman described her feelings of isolation, and the 
rejection of a family that "closed [her] way out": 
Soon after we started dating I had noticed that he was kind of 
possessive and he was very jealous. But I didn't really count it as 
out of the ordinary; it kind of flattered me to be honest. I kind of 
thought, well, he loves me this much that he cares, he don't want 
me speaking to this one or he don't want me going there without 
him. And I kind of thought that was really kind of nice, so I must 
have been something really special. 
There was something about him that frightened me because he 
was getting more and more abusive and he got more and more 
demanding and he kept isolating me and isolating me. I couldn't 
talk to my family, I couldn't talk to my friends. Wherever I went, I 
had to be by his side. If we travelled in the car, I had to look at 
the floorboards, I couldn't look out the window. 
But then things started getting real bad, because he started 
becoming very sexually abusive. Louis was a very rough sexual 
191. Mytokia Friend. in A PLEA FOR JUSTICE (Public Justice Center. Domestic Violence 
Task Force 1990); see also Thomas W. Waldron and Laura Lippman. Pardons for Battertd 
Women Considered. BALT. SUN. Jan. 11. 1991. at DI. 
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man. He was kind of into kinky things. He liked people to cut him 
and things like that. I couldn't do those things. 
I was eight months pregnant when I called her. And I said, 
Mom, I got to get out of here. There is something wrong in this 
house, and I can't take it anymore. I can't take him beating me. I 
can't take him kicking me. I can't take him throwing me up against 
the wall. I can't take him slapping me. I can't take him accusing 
me. The mental abuse was unreal. And I cannot do the things he 
wants me to do because some of them, Mom, are so outrageous that 
I can't stay and I need to get out. I need to come home. And she 
said, I'm sorry, but what you need to do is you need to work it 
out. It's not that way. You need to stay there and work it out. And 
that's what made me determined to stay there and work it out. I 
stayed and I tried all the harder. Whatever he said from then on, I 
did without question. I didn't care anymore. Whatever he wanted, I 
did it, trying to make it work because my mother had shut that 
door. She didn't realize at the time what she had done, I don't 
think. But she had closed my way out. 
So he went and got the gun. He loaded the service revolver 
and I was on my knees begging him for life and for a long time he 
was taunting me. And I told him I just, I couldn't do this. I, you 
know, of all the things, I didn't want to die. I really didn't want to 
die. The kids needed me, and we had a brand new baby. And this 
wasn't right. It had gone too far again and he finally agreed with 
me and I took the weapon down to the floor. I don't know how 
long. I don't know how long I begged him. But whatever happened, 
he put it down on the floor and went upstairs. 
I didn't feel my hand pull the trigger. I don't remember shoot-
ing him. All I remember was handing him the weapon and him 
grabbing it and I remember it going off. Well, as soon as that hap-
pened, I grabbed him and he said Joy, I love you, and when he did, 
I put him on the floor. When I put him on the floor, I know this 
sounds nuts, I went into an automatic response. I did CPR, mouth 
to mouth resuscitation. Then I ran downstairs and I came back up. I 
was all hyped up, and I was hysterical. I didn't know what to do. 
Because at first I th~ught he was gone. Then my mind kept saying 
it will be all right, he's all right, there's nothing wrong. Get a doc-
tor, do something. So then, after a little while, I thought-this was 
all happening very quickly-I thought, well, if he's not going to 
live, you don't wanna live. And I picked up the weapon and I 
turned it on myself. And something said, you got two children that 
you have to take care of and this is going to be OK.192 
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One woman, who began a sentence of life imprisonment in 1979 
for killing her batterer and was granted early parole release in 1991, 
described the escalating violence that led to the moment she decided 
she wanted to live free from the abuse: 
And he had popped the question to me and said, look, you 
don't have to work; I make enough money to take care of me and 
you both. Just quit your job. That's every girl's dream. I'm 19 
years old and somebody's telling me I don't have to work and he 
going to take care of me. I was like, girl, my boyfriend told me I 
don't have to work, he's going to take care of me so I don't have 
to go to work nowhere. I didn't know he was in the process of 
putting me in his own little prison, my own little world. I agreed. I 
quit my job. And I stayed home. And I never had any friends. With 
him keeping me within my apartment, one bedroom, one kitchen, 
and one dining room and den hooked together, I was really restrict-
ed to what I could do, where I could go, who I could see, who 
could come and see me and I was like within my own prison with-
in my own home. 
I would never go to the hospital. I would stay in my house 
since I was home all the time anyway. I would just doctor on my-
self, heal myself. He beat me up so bad and blackened both my 
eyes at once, but I knew he loved me and I loved him and whatev-
er came with loving him was all right with me. 
I just didn't like to have sex in the daytime. I'd rather for it 
to be dark. He came home around 12:30 or 1:00 and said come on, 
I want some sex. I said I ain't giving you nothing, get out of my 
face. So he, in so many ways, he took it, you know. So and when I 
was in the bed, everything-the sheet, the pillow and everything 
else was on the bed. But, when I woke up, the only thing was on 
the bed was the piece of sheet that I laid on because everything 
else was off the bed. That's how violently he was screwing me. 
And when I woke up and looked around, I didn't see him. But I 
got up, the pillow was on the floor. There was nothing on the bed 
but just a little piece of sheet I was laying on. The rest of it was 
on the floor next to the bed on my side. And when I woke up I 
heard the chains on the door that you open up to go out the door. I 
heard him going out the door and I jumped up and said, "Randy." 
He said, "I thought I killed you." He said "I slapped you, I twisted 
you, I banged you up and everything. I thought I killed you." And I 
stood up in the middle of the floor buck naked and I said, "So you 
Task Force 1990). 
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were going to leave me here for dead?" He had knocked me out 
unconscious and he was going out the door and he just thought I 
was dead. But I came through. 
And on the night that I stabbed my boyfriend, his friend was 
sitting in the chair at the kitchen table and watching as I slid down 
the refrigerator with him choking and beating me and lightning and 
flashing was going through my head . . . and his friend was watch-
ing. I didn't care if he was going to kill me. At first I didn't care. 
Because you know I felt like I didn't deserve to live. That's how 
little I felt of myself. That's how low I thought of myself. I had 
nothing. I felt like I wasn't going to leave nothing behind. I didn't 
have any kids. I didn't come from a loving family, so it didn't 
matter. But right in mid-stream, as he was beating me and as I was 
sliding down my refrigerator, something inside me was like I wanna 
live. You know, I have something to live for. Something is out 
there for me and I'm going to get it. And I'm not gonoa die, and 
I'm not gonna let him kill me in here with his friend watching. I 
meant that. 
I don't recall stabbing him no twenty-two times with no scis-
sors. But he is just as responsible for where he is as I am for 
where I am. I didn't do no more to him then he was trying to do 
to me, cause if I would not have protected myself against him, he 
was going to kill me. 
All I was trying to do was survive, and why can't the people 
who make the decisions see that?193 
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The final story reveals a similar pattern of isolation, and illus-
trates the role that protecting children has in both the decision to stay 
and, ultimately, to reject the violence: 
Our relationship started out real fine and there was no jealousy 
whatsoever. We did everything together. I got pregnant with our 
daughter Jamie. Thirteen months later our son was born, and that's 
when it started. When Steven was born. 
He was just really jealous. I could not have no friends in the 
house. I didn't socialize with any of the neighbors, except for may-
be one or two, and even then I had to wait until he wasn't home. 
He was choking me and I hollered for my daughter and I said, 
"Jamie, call the police." And he put her down on the bed and start-
ed choking her. And that day I promised to myself that I would 
never try to do anything to make him do anything like that again. 
My daughter-both my children were there. And my daughter 
193. Gale A. Hawkins, in A PLEA FOR JUSTICE (Public Justice Center, Domestic Violence 
Task Force 1990). 
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said that I loaded the gun, and it will be five years this September, 
and I still don't remember loading that gun. It hurts because I try to 
remember, and then he was shot six times in the back and both of 
my children seen it. 
In my heart, I was protecting me and my children from abuse, 
and the law system is saying to me I can't do that. l94 
The targeted audience for the film included: the Governor of 
Maryland, who could grant clemency or recommend parole to the 
Parole Commission; the Parole Commission; the Maryland Legislature, 
which in 1990 had rejected a bill that would have required the admis-
sion of battered spouse syndrome testimony, and would consider 
another version of the bill in 1991; the Maryland Congressional Dele-
gation; and the general public. 
The Governor of Maryland, William Donald Schaefer, was one 
of the first legal decisionmakers targeted. During his sixteen years as 
Mayor of the City of Baltimorel9S and his first four-year term as 
Governor, Schaefer had never actively supported legislation or policies 
designed to improve the plight of domestic violence victims. The 
Governor viewed the film with key members of his staff.l96 Moved 
by what he saw, he asked to meet with the women in the film. He 
met with those women and others for over two hours at the MCIW, 
and he listened to their stories. When Governor Schaefer emerged 
from that meeting, he told reporters how the experience had changed 
his understanding of the plight of battered women: 
You read a newspaper: "Mary Jones shot her husband." When you 
see Mary Jones and understand how she got there, it is a little dif-
ferent . . . . [The women told] stories of a lack of self-esteem, 
abuse, hoping things get better, things don't get better, and finally a 
point where the women break.197 
Later, testifying before a congressional subcommittee that was con-
sidering legislation intended to strengthen training for judges who deal 
with domestic violence and to encourage the enactment of state laws 
194. Carolyn S. Wallace, in A PLEA FOR JUSTICE (Public Justice Center, Domestic Vio-
lence Task Force 1990). 
195. Governor Schaefer served as Mayor of Baltimore from 1971 through 1987, and was 
elected Governor of Maryland in November of 1987. 
196. Wolfer, supra note 190; Telephone Interview with Kathy Shulman, Executive Direc-
tor, Public Justice Center (Oct. 2, 1992). 
197. Howard Schneider, Meeting Battered Women Face to Face, WASH. POST, Jan. IS, 
1991, at B7. 
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allowing the introduction of testimony of abuse and battered spouse 
syndrome, Schaefer commented: 
I never focused on the issue of domestic violence until two years 
ago. I had no interest in it at all and I started off unsympathetic. 
After hearing the women's stories I decided they should be given a 
chance to say how they were treated. l98 
The third and final piece of the storytelling campaign was the 
filing in January, 1991, of a 300-page petition seeking clemency on 
behalf of twelve inmates at the MCIW who were serving sentences 
from fifteen years to life for killing or attempting to kill their abus-
ers. The petition, entitled Twice Imprisoned, described the components 
of battered spouse syndrome, analyzed the law in Maryland and 
around the country with regard to the admissibility and use of this 
testimony, and described the clemency options available to the Gover-
nor. At the heart of the petition, however, are the stories of the four 
women featured in the videotape, and the stories of eight other wom-
en as well. The stories, called Inmate Profiles, included a careful 
review of the development of domestic violence in each relationship, 
a discussion of the specific circumstances surrounding the crime, a 
review of the woman's institutional record and achievements, a com-
mentary on her family and educational background, and a brief sum-
mary of the woman's plans if released. Most, if not all, of this infor-
mation was not before the court at trial or at sentencing, nor was it 
in the inmates' institutional parole files. 
As a result of the storytelling in all of its forms, in February, 
1991, the Governor signed executive orders commuting the sentences 
of eight women convicted of killing or attempting to kill their abus-
ers. Although the women became eligible for immediate release, they 
would be subject to supervised probation for the balance of their 
sentences. In announcing this decision, the governor's press secretary 
noted that the governor had met with several of the women and was 
"very impressed by the circumstances that led to their imprisonment," 
and "sympathize[d] with the difficulty they have had in the courts 
trying to explain their circumstances that led to the crime .... "199 
It was a historic and dramatic conclusion to the first phase of a suc-
198. Battered Women's Testimony, 1992: Hearings on H.R. 1252/53 Before the Subcomm. 
on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (statement of Governor William Donald Schaefer). 
199. Thomas Waldron, 8 Women Who Killed to Go Free: Schaefer Grants Clemency to 
Killers of Abusive Spouses or Lovers, BALT. SUN, Feb. 19, 1991, at AI. 
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cessful campaign in which storytelling had played a central role.200 
3. Stories to the Legislature: The Victim's Role in Making New 
Laws 
A similar "three-part" storytelling campaign-screenings of the 
film, face-to-face meetings, and public testimony from victims-was 
directed to the Maryland Legislature in 1991 as part of a strategy for 
gaining passage of a statute that would permit the introduction of 
battered spouse syndrome testimony. Screenings of A Plea For Justice 
were arranged for the legislature by the Public Justice Center, work-
ing with members of the congressional delegation and local 
jurisdictions' commissions for women. Many of the legislators who 
attended the screenings reported that they and their colleagues were 
moved by the film.wI A number of legislators who chose not to at-
tend the screenings saw the film later, when reform advocates used 
portable playback machines to screen the film for individual legisla-
tors.202 Even if legislators did not see the film, members of their 
staffs did and communicated their support for the legislation. In addi-
tion, numerous screenings at localities throughout the state and on 
television focused public attention on the specific domestic violence 
issues facing the Maryland General Assembly. Groups like the Junior 
League, and individual constituents, communicated their outrage and 
concern to their legislators after viewing the film.WJ 
Face-to-face meetings also played a role in advocacy around the 
battered spouse syndrome legislation. Women who had suffered years 
of abuse either met with legislators in one-to-one meetings or testified 
before legislative committees.204 Their stories emphasized the unfair-
ness that results when victims are silenced at their trials, and helped 
200. With this action, Schaefer became the second Governor in U.S. history to commute 
the sentences of women based on a belief that the women were suffering from battered 
spouse syndrome, and that their crimes were triggered by reported abuse at the hands of their 
husbands or boyfriends. A year earlier, Governor Richard F. Celeste of Ohio freed 25 women 
who had been victims of domestic violence and had killed or attempted to kill their abusers. 
Isabel Wilkerson, Clemency Granted to 25 Women Convicted for Assault or Murder, N.Y. 
TiMES, Dec. 22, 1990, § 1 at 1. 
201. See Interview with F; Vernon Boozer. Member of the Maryland State Senate. in 
Baltimore. Md. (Sept. 29. 1992); Interview with Delegate Kenneth C. Montague. Jr .• Member 
of the Maryland House of Delegates. in Baltimore, Md. (October 2, 1992). 
202. See FACTS AND FINDINGS, supra note 188. 
203. Wolfer et al.. supra note 115. 
204. See, e.g.. Hearings on H.B. 49 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 4015t Sess. 
(1991) (testimony of Margery Ann Rich and T. Annette Johnson). 
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move legislators to act where they had previously been unwilling.20s 
The result of these efforts was that the 1991 Maryland General 
Assembly finally passed the Battered Spouse Syndrome Bill, which 
took effect on July 1, 1991. Under this legislation, criminal defen-
dants who are on trial for assaulting, killing, or attempting to kill 
their abusive partners may introduce evidence of a history of batter-
ing, as well as expert testimony concerning battered spouse syndrome. 
Thus, the legislation finally offers battered women or men accused of 
killing their abusers an opportunity for fair trials in which they can 
tell their stories. 
In 1992, building on the success of the clemencylbattered spouse 
syndrome testimony campaign, advocates in Maryland shifted the 
focus of law reform efforts to Maryland's civil protection order stat~ 
ute.206 This statute was considered the worst in the nation, in both 
the scope of individuals covered and the kind of relief it provided for 
victims.207 The statute's protection did not extend to unmarried 
cohabitants unless they had a child together.2OS Victims, both mar-
ried and unmarried, had to be living with their abusers at the time of 
the abuse in order to be covered under the statute.209 The statute 
permitted the court to order the abuser out of the family home for up 
to thirty days.2\o This thirty-day limitation imposed on the "vacate" 
order stood in sharp contrast to the three years permitted in Califor-
nia, and was well below the one year permitted, on average, in the 
majority of the remaining states.211 Finally, the statute made no pro-
vision for ordering short-term financial relief for the victim and any 
children of the parties involved. 
As they developed a strategy for obtaining passage of a statute 
that would remedy these failings, advocates of domestic violence 
reform believed the battle would be a relatively easy one.212 The 
prior year's success in dealing with battered spouse syndrome issues 
had increased public awareness and political support for domestic vio-
20S. See Boozer, supra note 201. 
206. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-S01 to -SIO (1991). 
207. See, e.g., Domestic Violence Protection Order, 1992: Hearings on S. 282 Before the 
Judicial Proceedings Committee of the Maryland State Senate, 404th Sess. (1992) (testimony 
of Bonnie A. Kirkland, Deputy Legislative Officer, Office of the Governor) (audio tapes 
available from author). 
208. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-S01(e) (1991). 
209. [d. 
210. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-S06(e)(l) (1991). 
211. FiNN & COLSON, supra note 117, at 16-17. 
212. See generally Wolfer, supra note 190. 
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lence issues generally.213 The Governor was a principal sponsor of 
the legislation, the Attorney General had been at the head of a task 
force which recommended the changes,214 and a wide range of na-
tional and statewide groups had been calling for similar changes in 
recent reports.21S Finally, the fact that Maryland had the most nar-
row protection order statute in the country seemed to secure sentiment 
for change. 
At the ftrst legislative hearing, representatives from the 
Governor's office, the Attorney General, and other advocates for 
reform testifted in support of the bill.216 They described how the 
proposed bill's expansion of coverage to include unmarried 
cohabitants, a one year vacate order, and ftnancial relief would pro-
vide meaningful short-term protection for victims of domestic vio-
lence. Their testimony focused on Maryland's relative position nation-
ally in this area, as well as empirical data about the numbers of indi-
viduals left unprotected by the existing statute.217 This testimony 
was received, for the most part, with polite silence. But by the end of 
the hearing, reform advocates sensed that they would not achieve 
their objective as easily as they had originally anticipated. 
The ftrst sign of trouble appeared when Robert Sweeney, the 
Chief Judge of the Maryland District Court, testifted before the com-
mittee. Although testifying in support of the new protection order bill, 
his testimony actually reflected strong opposition and resistance to 
change: 
Mr. Chairman, I am appearing here at the request of Chief Judge 
Murphy . . . . I am appearing here in support of the bill, with some 
213. See, e.g., No Court Refuge for Battered Women, BALT. SUN, Ian. 24, 1992, at 6A; 
Parris N. Glendening, Violence-The Answer is Us, WASH. POST, Ian. 26, 1992, at C8. 
214. See INCREASING ACCESS TO IUSTICE, supra note 142, at 3, 52. 
215. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF IUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY 
VIOLENCE: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE (1990); MARYLAND NE'IWORK AGAINST DoMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, LEGISLATIVE AGENDA (1992); REPoRT ON GENDER BIAS, supra note 176, at 30; 
BROKEN BODIES, supra note 137, at 45. 
216. See Domestic Violence Protection Order, 1992: Hearings on S. 282 Before the Judi-
cial Proceedings Committee of the Maryland State Senate, 404th Sess. (1992) (audio tapes 
available from author). 
217. See, e.g., Domestic Violence Protection Order, 1992: Hearings on S. 282 Before the 
Judicial Proceedings Committee of the Maryland State Senate, 404th Sess. (1992) (testimony 
of Bonnie A. Kirkland, Deputy Legislative Officer, Office of the Governor) (audio tapes 
available from author); Domestic Violence Protection Order, 1992: Hearings on S. 282 Before 
the Judicial Proceedings Committee of the Maryland State Senate, 404th Sess. (1992) (testi-
mony of the Honorable J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland) (audio tapes 
available from author). 
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reservations. Our committee of seventeen judges considered this bill 
in substantial detail and, after considering all major provisions of 
the bill, would like to share with you some concerns that they 
had .... 
There are certain types of relief that are sought in this bill that 
do not lend themselves to a district court proceeding. One of these 
is a utilization of this act to award monetary relief. 
Ten years ago, the average district court judge in Maryland 
tried 3,600 cases in one year. Last year, district court judges tried 
5,500 in a year. To add to that caseload the burdens and the re-:-
sponsibility of making support payments that could last, not just for 
30 days, not just for a year, but to last until changed by some 
further court order, is a substantial responsibility. I suggest to you 
that it cannot be done in three to five minutes.2J8 
1289 
Committee members appeared more attentive to the concerns ex-
pressed about the potential burden on the courts than they had been 
to the advocates' legal argument for a more comprehensive and effec-
tive statute.219 In addition, a couple of widely-reported exchanges 
between senior legislators and witnesses revealed that certain legisla-
tors showed a complete lack of empathy for the victims the legisla-
tion sought to protect, and little understanding of their plight.220 The 
Chair of the Committee questioned the Attorney General on an aspect 
of the bill he found troubling: 
Let's say someone goes down to the corner bar, picks up some girl, 
keeps her for two or three days, then beats her up. Can she have 
him thrown out of his own house?221 
Even more disturbing was the question another legislator put to the 
Attorney General: 
218. Domestic Violence Protection Order, 1992: Hearings on S.282 Before the Judicial 
Proceedings Committee of the Maryland State Senate. 404th Sess. (1992) (testimony of Robert 
Sweeney, Maryland District Court Judge). 
219. Wolfer, supra note 171. 
220. Forget Those Dinosaurs-Let's Try to Name a State Neandenhal, BALT. SUN. Feb. 
3, 1992, at 2B. 
221. [d.; see also Domestic Violence Protection Order, 1992: Hearings on S. 282 Before 
the Judicial Proceedings Committee of the Maryland State Senate, 404th Sess. (1992) (re-
marks of Walter Baker, Member of the Maryland State Senate). It is interesting to note that 
Baker was one of the most outspoken critics of Governor Schaefer's decision to commute the 
sentences of eight abused women who had been convicted of killing their abusers. See Fern 
Shen & Howard Schneider, Freedom in a Divided World: Eight Maryland Women Who Killed 
Mates to Be Released Amid Debate Over Their Deeds, WASH. POST. Feb. 21, 1991. at Bl; 
see also supra notes 195-200 and acco~panying tex.t. 
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We have fifteen witnesses here testifying on a domestic violence 
matter. My question to you, the chief law man for the state of 
Maryland, is why can't we have the same kind of effort about a 
serious problem-we got the whole room full-to try to make our 
streets safe" I mean, where are our priorities? Cleaning domestic 
matters up or cleaning up and making our streets safe? I'm seri-
ous .... We have the most criminal nation of all the developed 
nations, and yet I don't see anybody trying to go ahead and offer a 
solution.222 
Although the Attorney General attempted to educate that legislator 
about the established link. between violence in the home and crime in 
the streets, it became clear to refonn advocates that a more effective 
method of communicating the urgent need for the legislation had to 
be developed. In planning follow-up meetings with legislators and 
public hearings before the House committee, refonn advocates again 
turned to storytelling as a critical part of the advocacy effort. 
When the bill reached the House committee, the "line-up" of 
witnesses changed. As had been the case at the first legislative hear-
ing, representatives from the Governor's office, the Attorney General, 
and other advocates for refonn testified in support of the bill. But in 
addition to this testimony, the committee then heard the testimony of 
women who had been victimized by domestic violence. Three women 
who had been severely injured as a result of inadequacies in the 
existing law told their stories to the legislature, and described the 
pain and anguish they had suffered. 
A Baltimore woman, identified only as "Susan," told the commit-
tee that she had obtained a thirty-day court order that required her 
abusive husband to stay away from their home. Susan testified that 
her husband stalked her during this period, and when the order ex-
pired he cornered her at a laundromat, where he set her on fire. He 
was sentenced to 30 years in prison. She was pennanently disfigured. 
Susan said, "I got the protection order like 1 was supposed to, but it 
didn't help me .... Please change the law."m 
222. Domestic Violence Protection Order, 1992: Hearings on S. 282 Before the Judicial 
Proceedings Committee of the Maryland State Senate, 404th Sess. (1992) (remarks of Freder-
ick C. Malkus, Member of the Maryland State Senate). 
223. Domestic Violence Protection Order, 1992: Hearings on H.463 Before the Judiciary 
Committee of the Maryland General Assembly, 404th Sess. (1992) (anonymous testimony of 
"Susan," a victim of domestic violence); see Retha Hill, Victims Urge More Protection Under 
Md. Domestic Violence Laws, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1992, at CS. 
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Another Baltimore woman, "Darlene," testified that she had peti-
tioned the court three times over a three-month period to keep her 
husband away from her. When the first thirty-day order expired, her 
husband returned home and broke her jaw. Her request for a second 
protection order was denied because her husband was not living with 
her at that time. Darlene told the committee that he again returned 
home, "sexually violated me, ripped my hair out, kicked me, beat me 
and urinated on me." Her third request for a protection order was 
granted. The order was in effect at the time of her testimony but she 
told the committee it would expire soon.224 
The third victim, "Sarah," testifying before a hushed hearing 
room, described the details of the "separation assault" she experienced 
when she tried to leave her abusive husband. Sarah testified that her 
estranged husband stalked and abused her for months after she left 
him. On one occasion, she said, he abducted her from a friend's 
house, took her to a secluded area, put a rope around her neck, and 
threatened to drag her from the back of his truck until she died. 
Another time, she testified, he taped her mouth shut and threatened 
her with a razor blade. 
Sarah was a classic victim of domestic violence suffering physi-
cal and mental abuse at the hands of her husband for trying to sepa-
rate from him. Under the existing law, however, Sarah was not eligi-
ble for a protective order. This was based solely on the fact that she 
did not live with her husband at the time of the abuse. The criminal 
justice system eventually caught up with him, and he was convicted 
of battery.22S 
The testimony of the victims was followed by that of the Chief 
Judge of the District Court, who provided testimony that paralleled 
the testimony he had provided to the Senate committee.226 Its im-
pact, however, was significantly blunted by the powerful stories that 
preceded it. Increased paperwork for judges and clerks did not seem 
nearly as overwhelming an obstacle as it had in the previous hearing 
224. Domestic Violence Protection Order, 1992: Hearings on H.463 Before the Judiciary 
Committee of the Maryland General Assembly, 404th Sess. (1992) (anonymous testimony of 
"Darlene," a victim of domestic violence). 
225. Domestic Violence Protection Order, 1992: Hearings on H.463 Before the Judiciary 
Committee of the Maryland General Assembly, 404th Sess. (1992) (anonymous testimony of 
"Sarah," a victim of domestic violence). 
226. Domestic Violence Protection Order, 1992: Hearings on H.463 Before the Judiciary 
Committee of the Maryland General Assembly, 404th Sess. (1992) (testimony of Robert F. 
Sweeney, chief judge of the Maryland District Court). 
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in comparison to the dramatic and life-threatening injuries suffered by 
the victims as a result of an inadequate law. 
The dynamics of lobbying for successful passage of a bill are 
complex, and the role of the public hearings limited. But according to 
many of those involved in the campaign to reform Maryland's civil 
protection order, the victim's testimony played a significant role.227 
In addition to limiting the immediate impact of the judicial testimony 
regarding the burdens that would be placed on the judicial system, 
the victims' testimony resulted in greater media attention for the 
hearings and the proposed bill.228 The increased media attention was 
followed by increased pressure from constituents urging their legisla-
tors to support the bill. Although there was some compromise on the 
length of the duration of the vacate order and the financial relief 
provisions, the campaign to improve Maryland's protection order 
statute ultimately succeeded. On May 5, 1992, Maryland entered the 
"modem age" of legal protection for victims of domestic violence 
when Governor Schaefer signed the new protection order into law.229 
With the enactment of this new law, Maryland made significant prog-
ress, creating a remedy that is finally responsive to the needs of do-
mestic violence victims-broad enough in its coverage to protect 
those who need it and comprehensive enough in its remedies to pro-
vide a "safe place" for those who are at their most vulnerable.230 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship between law and social change is complex. 
There is evidence, however, that law can have a significant impact on 
redressing social problems when the historically unrepresented have a 
voice in the lawmaking process. Legal storytelling-stories told to 
legal decisionmakers about the pain that results from inadequate 
227. See Boozer, supra note 201; Grosfeld. supra note 150; Montague, supra note 201; 
Wolfer. supra note 190. 
228. See. e.g., Hill, supra note 223, at C5. 
229. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506 to -515 (1991 & Supp. 1992). See Judith 
Wolfer & Jane C. Murphy, Domestic Violence Law Poses Challenges for the Courts, MD. 
FAM. L. MONTHLY, June 1992, at 3. 
230. The unusual degree of institutional and political support for this new law was high-
lighted by the fact that, shortly after its passage, the Chief Judge of Maryland established a 
Special Ad Hoc Committee of judges and expert consultants to oversee the implementation of 
the new protection order statute. This was the first time in anyone's memory such a commit-
tee had been established to assist in implementing any legislation. See Letter from Robert C. 
Murphy, Chief Judge, Court of Appeals of Maryland, to Maryland District and Circuit Court 
Judges and Clerks (Sept. 22, 1992). 
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laws-must be an integral part of law reform work. Critical race and 
feminist legal scholars have begun to change the nature of legal dis-
course by developing the narrative as a legitimate and powerful form 
of scholarship. Scholars and practitioners must build upon this work 
to integrate storytelling into lawmaking to help ensure lasting and 
meaningful social change. 
The experience of those seeking to reform domestic violence 
laws demonstrates the power of the narrative as a key element of 
social change strategy. Direct storytelling by domestic violence vic-
tims hurt by the inadequacy of the legal system was a powerful tool 
in reversing Maryland's historical pattern of denial and silence in the 
face of widespread family violence. 
Ultimately, this is a story about domestic violence victims and 
their advocates, who forced decision-makers to listen after decades of 
inattention to the problem. They listened, not only to the experts, and 
not only to the statistical and fiscal impact testimony-they listened 
to the stories of the women and children who have been devastated 
by the legal system's historical tolerance of violence in the home. 
The lessons learned during this campaign to reform domestic violence 
laws should serve as a challenge to both scholars and practitioners-a 
challenge to recognize the essential role that storytelling can play in 
law reform, and to develop the use of storytelling as a critical tool in 
future campaigns to make the law a vital instrument of social change. 
